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Abstract 
This thesis explores and links some ofPiato's ideas on both language and understanding. There are close 
readings of the whole of the Cratvlus and the Phaedrus from 257b7 to the end which conclude that: no 
knowledge can be found from etymology; Greek as a language is not perfect; and we must search for a 
knowledge outside language. Using various other texts, but particularly the Statesman, there are 
comments on the difference between the physical world we inhabit and the ideal world of abstracts that 
we must try to understand through using paradigms, a category in which I include myths. There is a broad 
conclusion that, despite language being imperfect and problematic, we must use it since it is our only tool 
with which we can create an approximation of the ideal in order to progress towards understanding. 
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Introduction 
Before any study of the content of an author's work can be carried out, it seems important 
first to look at the method that author used in setting out his 1 beliefs. There has been 
much written on Plato's use of the dramatic dialogue as a genre, and on his use of myth 
within those dialogues. But it seems to me that it is also important to consider the 
building blocks of those dialogues: they are all, of course, made out oflanguage. I do not 
believe that there can be any good understanding of Plato unless there is an understanding 
of his views on the thing from which he constructs his dialogues. The dialogues are only 
possible because of language, and we must look at how Plato viewed the tool of his 
philosophical trade. In order to do this, I begin with a detailed and close reading of the 
Cratylus2, where Plato plays with names, etymologies and language as a whole. I finish 
off the section on language with a close reading of the end of the Phaedrus (257b7 to the 
end). I hope to show that Plato was very aware of the inadequacies of language in our 
search for pure knowledge, both individual words as themselves and their use in 
combination. They will never describe the ideal world of abstracts. From there, I will 
proceed to try to explain how I believe Plato attempts to use this imperfect tool to get his 
readers going in the process of understanding those pure abstracts. I will try to show how 
paradigms and myths perform the same task, in attempting some kind of explanation of 
the inexplicable. I hope to show that they are the routes towards the goal of the ideal, a 
1 I will use the male pronoun to stand for any unspecified human for the sake of convenience and 
conciseness. 
2 In the translations given, for the Phaedrus and the Statesman I will quote Rowe, Warminster, 1986 and 
1995 respectively, and for all other translations I will quote Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 4th edition, 
Oxford, 1953, unless I indicate otherwise. 
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goal which we may never rea~h because we are physical beings in a physical world 
attempting to understand non•physical abstracts such as 'statesman' or 'justice'. We will 
always have to compromise, because even in our attempts at describing or defining ideal 
abstracts, we have to use physical language. But language's usefulness must be the 
starting point. 
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Tbe Argument with Hermogenes 
The Cratylus is a puzzling dialogue. The arguments between the characters develop along 
structured lines, but the main points of the dialogue seem to be shown to us rather than 
told to us: we cannot just listen to the words, but we have to think about what Plato 
means more generally; we have to try to understand what is going on behind the face 
value of the words that the characters use. With the Cratylus, it seems best to start from 
the end: "ovo& navv vouv £xovros av()pwnov imrpiljfavra OVOJlamv aurov ICUl n}v 
aurou IJIVX~V Ospansvszv" ("no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of 
his mind in the power of names") (440 c3-5). This occurs in Socrates' conclusion. The 
result of all that has gone before is that ovoJlam are not to be trusted. Bearing in mind 
this conclusion, it is now safe, or safer, to go back to the beginning and examine how this 
conclusion is reached, not only the arguments but also the style of conversation. It is 
playful, language is manipulated. Socrates seems to argue in the second half against the 
point of view he seemed to hold in the first: he enters at Hermogenes' request to solve a 
debate on the nature of language, whether a name is a name because men say so, or 
whether each thing has an appropriate and correct name, and any other name which men 
use to refer to it is not a name at all. By the end, Socrates appears to have dismissed both 
theories, and the debate is on language's relationship with the world. The book ends up 
talking explicitly about Heracleitean flux, and it seems to me that that was a major theme 
of the dialogue. 
The dialogue opens with Hermogenes asking whether Socrates might join the discussion 
he has been having with Cratylus. He explains that the discussion was about names, sets 
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out what he believes Cratylus' position to be and asks Socrates what his is. Socrates' 
reply begins slightly mysteriously: "Jj nal 'Jnnov[Kou 'EpJlOYcVcS, na,lau1 napotJlta 
on xakna ra KaAa ianv onn ixczJla()civ· Kal Dry Kal ro 7rcpi rwv OVOJlclfCOV ou 
OJlLKfJOV royxavcz ov Jlcl()1Jita" ("Son ofHipponicus, there is an ancient saying that 
'hard is the knowledge of the good'. And the knowledge of names is a great part of 
knowledge") (384a8-b2). However, in his first words of the dialogue, Socrates hints at all 
that will follow. Any knowledge or exploration ()la()clv) of names is linked to a 
knowledge or exploration of ra KaM. He goes on to say that he could only afford the 
one drachma course on names rather than Prodicus' fifty drachma course. If he had 
attended that, then he ironically says he would be able immediately to give an answer. 
But he did not, so they have to explore the question themselves. Socrates starts with an 
ironical attack explicitly on Prodicus, but presumably aimed at all who claimed to impart 
knowledge through language in lectures, a form of education which Plato did not believe 
in. It is no good just listening; one must actively engage and think; passive attempts at 
knowledge by osmosis through hearing another's words are no good. We will discover 
just how difficult and philosophically unreliable a thing language is, and that the only 
way to knowledge is through active applied thought aimed not at words, but at the 
concepts which they try to stand for. It is unfortunate that language is our only tool for 
looking at ra KaM, but it is all we have. We must use it, but be aware of its limitations 
and problems. 
It is surely significant that it is Hermogenes who sets out Cratylus' position to Socrates 
and does not let him do it himself Just as Socrates usually does not give a doctrine but 
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expresses his ideas as a reported conversation (Svmposium) or a model or a myth 
(Republic or Phaedrus), so Cratylus' position does not come from his own mouth but is 
reported by another. Cratylus'is comparable to Socrates when Hermogenes says of him 
"Kat EJ10V ipw~wvros Kat npofJvj10VJ1SVOV si8&vat on nors Aiy&L, our& anoaa<p&i 
ov8sv sipwvsvsra[ r& npos J1&, npoa7COLOVJ1&VOS n auras iv savrcp 8tavosia0at ws 
d&vs 1r&pt avrov, 3 si fJovA.otro aa<J>ws dnsiv, 1f0l~O&l&V av Kat EJ1S OJ10Aoysiv Kat 
Uy&LV an&p avros Uyd' ("And when I am anxious to have a further explanation, he is 
ironical and mysterious, and ~eems to imply that he has a notion of his own about the 
matter if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me if he chose to be 
intelligible") (383b7-384a4). Plato is feeding Socrates' enemies, those who saw him as a 
sophist and a fraud. It seems that one of Socrates' adversaries in this dialogue is a version 
of Socrates himself, but rathe.r than having no theory, just refusing to say what his theory 
is. But Socrates will prove that there cannot be two Socrateses, and Cratylus will end up 
seeming arrogant, extremist and of little use to mankind because of what he seems to 
believe about language. After Cratylus has been built up as another Socrates, we have to 
wait until427e5 before he re-:appears. In the meantime, Socrates has argued against 
Hermogenes, which Cratylus had previously done, and at 428e6 Cratylus agrees with 
Socrates that correct names reflect the true nature of the nominata. However, as becomes 
clear very quickly, Socrates and Cratylus are using words to mean rather different things. 
Their conversation is required to show this. 
However, first Socrates must talk to Hermogenes, who sets out his position at 384c 10-
e2: "Kat J.l~V Eywys, 6J EmKparss, no.u.&KLS 8~ Kat rovrcp 8takz0sts Kat aAA.ots 
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7rOMotS I ov 8vvajlat 7reta(}ijvat ills ill7] ns opeorl]s OVOJlaros ij ovver}KI] Kal 
,/, I V \~\ ~~ I 1 11 ~ I \ "£J - '£J I \ ne'I'VKeVat OVOJ.la ovuev ovueVt, a/VI.U VOJ.lq:> Kat eoet rwv eotaavrwv re Kat 
JlOVOV napa KpawA.ov, aMQ: Kat nap' a.AAov orovovv" ("I have often talked over 
this matter, Socrates, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that 
there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement~ any 
name which you give, in my opinion, is the right one, and if you change that and give 
another, the new name is as good as the old- we frequently change the names of our 
slaves, and the newly imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name given to 
anything by nature; all is convention and the habit of the users"). The ovoJlara only 
mean what they do by "ovveryK1J Kat OJ.loA.oyia", but Herrnogenes seems to believe that 
this kind of convention can be set up by anyone at any time. This would mean that there 
would not be any development of language: words would not grow out of other words, 
but would just be invented and somehow put into common use. Herrnogenes does not 
seem to think that the conventions he talks of stem from anywhere. Socrates wants to 
show that there must be at least some reason as to why words are agreed to mean what 
they do, even if that reason is not necessarily a useful or good one. Language as a whole 
evolves. It is true that it would be possible for two people to create a language starting 
from scratch by using their own convention. But that is not how the language that both 
Socrates and Herrnogenes actually do use came about. One must speak "opews" 
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("correctly") according to the convention one is born into, because any other method of 
speaking "esapapT1JG£Tat T£ Kat ou8£v 1Wt~a£l'' ("will result in error and failure") 
(387bll-c4). 
However, they can clarify their own conventions within that language by making sure 
that they both mean the same thing by the same word. So, at the start of the discussion, 
Socrates Jays down some ground rules as to the purpose of ovopaTa: "ouKOVV rov 
Uy£tV popwv TO ovopa(£tv; ovopa(ovT£S yap 7WV Uyovm rous A.oyovs" ("is not 
naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak") (387c6-7); "dp' ou 
8t8aCJKOJ.1EV TL aAA~AoVS Kat Ta npaypaTa 8taKptVOJ.1£V n EX£l'' ("(in naming] do we 
not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?") 
(388bl0-Il); "ovopa apa 8t8aCJKaMKOV ri ianv opyavov Kat 8taKplTIKOV rijs 
ouaias" ("a name is an instrwnent of teaching and of distinguishing natures") (3 88b 13-
cl ). Words have both a practical and a didactic nature. They are our means of 
distinguishing Reality in communication, and our means of trying to find out more about 
it. They are the tools of the philosopher. 
Socrates starts exploring language as ifHermogenes is completely wrong, as if each word 
is correct in nature. At 388e7-389a3, Socrates comes up with the idea of a 8rypwvpyos, a 
creator who made their language. He is given his job description at "dp' oov, Cb 
f3iAnar£, Kat TO EKaarcp 1Jva£L 1C£1JVKOS ovopa TOV vopo()i"'v EK£lVOV £is rous 
1J()oyyovs Kat Tas avli.Aaf3as 8£1 iniaraaf}at nOivat, Kat f3UnovTa npos auTO 
EK£lVO 0 £anv ovopa, navTa Ta OVOJ.laTCOV eiTT/S,' £L 8£ pry £LS Tas auras 
8 
avM.af3as eteaaros o vopoelr1Js rWrycnv, ou8ev &I rouro a<Jlif)l>yvo&lv" ("then, as 
to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each 
thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal 
name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must not misinterpret the fact that 
different legislators will not use the same syllables") (389d4-el). The 8rypwupyos must 
create each name so that there is a connection between the name and thing being named. 
But this D1JJLLOupyos is not meant completely literally: he exists only for the purposes of 
this discussion so that they can look at language as if it were created by just one person. 
At 390d5-8, they reach the conclusion that the dialectician, as user of words, is the one to 
direct the D1JJ1toupyos on how he should make them, by analogy with other tools, whose 
. . 
users know how to use them but whose makers know how to make them. This leads 
Socrates to pledge his allegiance to Cratylus ( d9-e I) and say "teat Kpaw.A.os a.A7J()ij 
J.iy£L AEycov lj>VO£L ra OVOJlara dvat 'Wlt; trpaypacn, Kaz OU 1ravra DTJJlLOUpyov 
OVOJlcXTCOV £I vat, aA..Ad povov eK£lVOV TOV atro{JJ.inovra £lS ro r,ry lj>VO£L OVOpa OV 
eteaanp Kat 8uvap£VOV aurou TO £T8os n(}svat c'fs T£ ra ypappara Kat rat; 
auM.af3as" ("and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that 
not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each 
thing by nature has, and is able to express this name in letters and syllables") (390d 11-
e5). Hermogenes cannot answer this because they are talking completely at cross-
purposes. Hermogenes is talking about the language he sees around him, Greek, whereas 
Socrates is talking about language as perhaps it should be, a language which is naturally 
and correctly linked to the world it describes. This confusion allows Socrates to claim at 
9 
39la8-b2 that together they have shown names to have a natural correctness. However, 
they did not prove it but assumed it in the analogy with the shuttle. It was taken as 
obvious that anyone making a shuttle would look to the ideal shuttle as a model, and that 
the maker of names would do the same, that is look to what would ideally do the job 
required of it. If indeed such a thing were possible for a man, then we would have an 
ideal language, one which worked and performed the tasks which we want it to. But the 
ambiguous use of To ovopa proves in itself that Hermogenes is at least partly correct. 
Socrates, mimicking Cratylus, used it to mean the ideal name, whereas Hermogenes 
assumed it referred to the names in everyday use. They needed to set up, however 
artificially, a convention on what TO ovopa referred to. They needed to impose some 
separation and distinction on the meaning of the word, or else no learning can occur. 
They are currently no further forward than when Socrates was called into the discussion, 
except perhaps that Socrates has shown how difficult it will be to be able to come up with 
definite answers on this problem of what language is and how it works. 
Socrates demonstrates this point with reference to Homer (39lcl0-392e5). He quotes 
'"ov 2av8ov' <f>TJm, 'KaAiovm Ocoi, av8pcs 8e LKdp.av8pov"' ('"whom' as he says, 
'the gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander"')(391e5-6), "ncpi ri}s opvreos ijv 
Uycl. on 1Cahci8a ICliCArJCJJCOtJm Ocoi, av8pcs 8i ICUJ.llVDrv" ("about the bird which, as 
he says, 'the gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis"') (392a3-5) and the examples of 
Batieia and Myrina and Hector's son, who is referred to as both Scamandrios and 
Astyanax. By using Homer, Plato has a wealth of examples available which he knows his 
audience will be familiar \vith. The point seems to be that the same thing can have two 
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names: both refer to and are understood to refer to one thing, but one may be more 
descriptive than the other. Homer can give his characters 'appropriate' and 
'inappropriate' ones as he wishes: Homer can be, to some extent, the Df1J1WVpyos of 
names. Sometimes the names help the audience to an understanding of the thing named, 
but what is important is the understanding of the nominata, not the name, for that is 
subject to the arbitrary will and judgement of the namer, in this case Homer. In the ideal 
language the name will describe and therefore help, but in our language it may not, it 
will probably be just a label. What must be examined is the thing itself: "ei 8e iv 
erepms ov)J.af3a'"is ij iv erepats ro amo aTIJlaivet, ov8ev npayJla" ("and whether 
the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, makes no difference, provided the 
meaning is retained") (393dl-5). Having just concluded that names should not be studied 
but the things they refer to, Plato wi11 turn the discussion, apparently rather oddly, to a 
section of etymologising by Socrates. These apparent contradictions of Socrates' force 
the reader to try to work out what it is that he means by what he says in this dialogue. He 
will not be, perhaps cannot be, straight forward and explicit on this subject. 
This section begins with Socrates giving some etymologies of the names of people from 
mythology. At first it is not immediately clear how serious he is being. The etymologies 
themselves sound fairly plausible until Zeus is introduced, when we are told that his 
name derives from a combina~ion of Zena, Dion and "8t' ov c;'ijv ad nam rois c;wmv 
vnapx,d' ("[the god] through whom all creatures always have life") (396b 1 ). The 
dubious nature of Socrates' explanation ofKronos (from "ro ~raeapov avrov Kai 
a~rl]parov rov vov" ("his pure and clear mind") (396b6-7)) and Uranus ("opwaa ra 
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avm" ("looking up") (396c 1 )) is hinted at by Socrates, when he says that if only he could 
remember more Hesiod "then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to 
me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end" ("ovK av 
braVOJ.lTJV Dlc~UOV ros opOws avrois ra OVOJ.lara Kclral, EWS Ct1rc1rctpa0ryv rijs 
ao~fas raVTTJal rl 1r0l~Ocl, ci apa Ct1rcpcl ii OV, ry ejJ.Ol c~at~VTJS VVV OVTWal 
npoa7remWKcV apn OVK ot8' onoOcv") (396c5-dl). Hermogenes, with a degree of irony 
considering that the talk is of gods, says "J.lot 8oKcis roa7rcp oi ivOovmwvrcs 
i~ai~VTJS XPTJOJ..Up8clv" ("he seems to me like a prophet newly inspired, and seem to be 
uttering oracles") (396d2-3), to which Socrates replies that the reason for this is his 
attendance at a lecture given by Euthyphro, so that "his wisdom and enchanting 
ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul" ("Ktv8vvcvct 
O~V ivOovmwv ov J.lOVOV ra ibra J.lOV ipnAijaaz rijs OOlJ.lOVtas ao~ias, a.ua Kat 
rijs IJ!Ums bcciAij~(}az") (396d6-8). Again there is the emphasis on hearing and not 
thinking. The words, supposedly, have entered Socrates' ears and become wisdom in his 
soul without any questioning or consideration. But this is all ironic. As is common in 
Plato, we have to be wary of the tone of"ao~ia" and ask how much irony is contained in 
it. Here, I believe, it is meant to be completely ironic. It is not uncommon for Socrates to 
be inspired by a Muse before he tells a myth (in Phaedrus for example), but here his soul 
has been inspired by an etymologist. This must indicate to the reader that what follows is 
not to be taken at face value, indeed it is to be viewed with the same suspicion we would 
reserve for the possibility of Socrates quietly attending a lecture on etymology and being 
inspired by it. Euthyphro will be referred to again, for example at 400al, where Socrates 
says that his etymologies might not be good enough for Euthyphro's disciples because 
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they would consider them "l/JopnKov" ("banal") (400a2). Socrates promises to be more 
imaginative; he wants to 'discover' things that are entertaining and witty. Socrates is at 
play. 
Socrates points out his own sophistic behaviour with "iav pry &uA.a{Jwpm, ln r~pepov 
aol/Jmrepos rov oiovros yevia(}m" ("ifl am not careful, before tomorrow's dawn I 
shall be wiser than I ought to be") (399a4-5). This is a reference back to 396d I ff, where 
he said that he would rid himself of his Euthyphronic inspiration tomorrow if a priest or 
sophist can be found. Again "aol/Jmr&pos" is heavily ironic, as Plato points out that he is 
making Socrates perform a sort of satire on etymologists: they claim a wisdom that they 
cannot possess, and we will discover that wisdom does not lie inside words anyway. 
But the tone of the satire fluctuates. The following section deals with some etymologies 
that lead to key Platonic thoughts, even though the etymologies themselves are not to be 
taken too seriously. At 399c l-7, we are told that avOpmnos comes from avaOpel and 
onmn£, because man is the creature who looks up to what he sees. For Plato, 'up' is good 
and to be sought after and 'down' is bad and to got away from; we need look no further 
than Phaedrus for this idea. This tends to indicate that avOpmnos, according to this 
etymology, is in his natural element when philosophising in order to move upwards 
towards knowledge and divinity. Socrates has created an etymology to reflect his view of 
the importance of philosophy. The point on philosophy is serious, how it is reached is 
entirely playful. 
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At 399dl0-400b7, Socrates talks about vmxrr He manages to derive it from two different 
etymologies so that he can get at what he believed to be the nature of the soul. It either 
comes from avaljli}xov (399e I), which means to revive, so that VJVXlJ is the 'living' part 
of avOpwrros, or it is a shortened form of <jJvaixlJ, the noun from the phrase "fi </Jvmv 
oxt:l Kat ixd' ("that which carries and holds nature") ( 400b2) so that VJVXlJ is that 
which connects man to his environment and a natural, and therefore correct, way of 
being. The circle is completed at 400cl-10, where awpa (body) is connected to aijpa 
(grave) and a7Jfiazvt:z (to indicate), along with acf>t;t:raz (to be kept safe). This means that 
the body can be not only a safe place for the soul to stay while it is there and the driving 
force of life, but also a grave in which the soul is incarcerated. This idea is also found at 
Phaedrus 250c2-6 and Gorgias 293al ff in equally playful circumstances. But as Socrates 
says at Gorgjas 493c3-5 about this idea and a comparison of the soul to a seive, "mur' 
E1rlE:lKWS piv E<JTlV V1r0 Tl arorra, OlJAol p~v 0 irw {3ovM>pat aoz iv&t~clpE:VOS, iav 
rrros otos rt: Jj rrt:laat Jtt:raOiaOat" ("these notions are strange enough, but they show 
the principle which, ifl can, I would fain prove to you"). The verbal connection itself 
reveals nothing, but this does not mean that it does not provoke some interesting imagery 
that may be useful; we should not trust this linguistic connivance or coincidence to show 
us anything in itself, but we should exploit it as an aid to philosophy. So, for example, we 
may be able to connect this idea with a previous etymology so that perhaps in order to 
free itself, the soul must escape by being within a proper "avOpcorros", who is a 
philosopher and looks up to find divinity and knowledge as is the natural way. Only then 
can the vnJXlJ fulfil itself and escape its benign captor, grow its wings and fly upwards 
into knowledge. Plato is encouraging us as readers to play with language as Socrates is 
14 
doing and see what we come up with, but we cannot trust the results in a literal sense. 
Language may have its 'niceties', but these in themselves prove nothing. 
But there is an overall point in what Socrates says. At 40 I e5, he says "wyaBi, 
ivvt:vch}lca n OJliJvos aol/J{as" ("my good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom"). 
This is a fantastic metaphor if viewed in the light of the rest of the dialogue and 
especially what immediately follows it. The coherent whole of the argument (the swarm) 
is made up from the chaotic, fast flying particles (the bees) that are its constituent parts: 
each individual etymology flies around apparently rather randomly, but the result is a 
movement of an understandable argument if one looks at the bigger picture and tries to 
take it all in at once. Socrates immediately follows this with the idea that the first idle 
chatterers may have been Heracleitean, because both Cronos and Rhea are connected 
with streams. This is the first explicit reference to Heracleitus and his theory of flux 
which will play such a large part in Socrates' etymologising. We may be able to go back 
to the metaphor and say that the internal flux of the constant movement of all those bees 
leads to a relatively stable argument on the bigger scale. We should look not to the flux, 
but to what Plato uses it to form. 
In the section on Hades, 403a5-404b4, Socrates tries to change our notions of death so 
that it becomes a positive thing. Socrates manages to conclude that Hades is 
"</)lA.oaoif>ov" ("a philosopher") (404a2) because he does not have to deal with the evils 
of the body, but can exploit the desire for virtue that dwells in every soul when it is freed 
from the mistaken desires of the physical. It is for this 'reason' that Plato has Hades come 
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from "ei8evat" ("to know") (404b3), because he knOWS "m:lvra Ta KaAa" ("all noble 
things") (404b3). Whilst the general principles of what Socrates is saying are not 
unPlatonic, it seems very odd that Hades should be a philosopher. Humans should aim to 
become philosophers: this section seems to indicate that as humans, we should use Hades 
as a model; in other words, we should aim at death. For Plato, the physical body did 
detract from philosophy, where true happiness lies, but we should not aim at death, rather 
use our lives as best as we can. To make Hades so positive shows how language can be 
manipulated to 'prove' a point that should not be examined through words and 
etymology, but through ideas. The words should be expressing the ideas, rather than the 
ideas coming from the words. To 'prove' that Hades is the model for av()pwnot is very 
clever, but it shows us that Socrates here is being as much of a "aotJ>ran}s"3 ( 403e4) as he 
claims Hades to be, whilst in the same breath declaring him a philosopher. 
Another example of truth within playfulness is "ras 8i 'Movmas' T£ Kat oA.ws n}v 
)lOVmKT/v ana TOV pilJa()az, ros BOlK£V, Kal rns ~Tfrrl0£WS T£ Kai tJ>t.Aoaot/>ias TO 
ovo)la rouro brwvoJwaev" ("the name of the Muses and of music would seem to be 
derived from their desire to make philosophical inquiries") (406a3-6). Music and 
philosophy are strongly linked throughout Plato, and here Socrates makes the names 
derive from the same source. But this idea about music and philosophy appears amid 
some etymologies concerning the gods that are, at the very least, eyebrow-raising. For 
example, Apollo is so called either because he is a purifier, "ano.Wvwv", or he is sincere, 
3 
"ocxjllonjs" here, I think, carries an extended meaning to indicate the arrogance of the 'over-wise', those 
who believe themselves to be wise, but are not. It can be used in a positive sense, at Republic 397a, 404a 
and S96d and Symposium 203d8, but the context of a sort of attack on etymological practices calls this 
'wisdom' into question. 
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"anll..ovs", or he is "act f3aA..Ao.Jv" or the one who moves things, such as harmony, 
together, "oJlonoA.Wv" ( 405b9-406a2). All these etymologies have some relevance to the 
character of Apollo; even the one Socrates claims is to be avoided, "anoA.Wv", is 
important at the start of the Iliad, for example. But they cannot all be true, indeed I hope 
to show that Plato does not really believe any of them. However each one is revealing of 
Apollo, and so in some sense correct, even if not the correct etymology. It is Socrates' 
skill in language that allows him to play in this way, to bring out truths through dubious 
word games. We do not have to take what Socrates says seriously: we can still appreciate 
that philosophy is somehow connected to the Muses, but not because Movaat and 
JlOvmKT} are said to derive from JtmaOat (to search). We know from elsewhere, like 
Socrates' speeches in the Phaedrus, that he will call on a Muse before embarking on 
fanciful philosophy and myth-making with a serious centre. But in this dialogue, his 
Muse is Eut~yphro the etymologist. There is no real explanation as to why Muses are 
connected to philosophy, only ''JlwaOat". The words themselves can appear to 'prove' 
something, but as we see from Apollo's multiple etymologies, these are created as much 
as discovered. They may be true, they may not be. If two words do come from the same 
source, which stands for one concept, then the two derivative words also link back to that 
same concept: but this does not help us unless we understand that original concept. It 
does not matter whether Socrates is correct or not in his etymology, because what are 
important are the ideas behind the words: these are not explained to us here, we have to 
import them from other dialogues. The words given to us here are not enough unless we 
understand what lies behind them. We should enjoy the wit and the fanciful pictures 
created for us, but must also examine what is said in order to look behind it. 
17 
There is an admission of the playfulness at "JlcyaA.a, Cb 1ral 'J7r7roviKov, ipwrqs. aMd 
&an yap Kat anov8aiws cipTJJlEVOS 0 rpo1rOS rwv OVOJlclf(J)V rovrots rois 8&ois Kat 
1fat8tKWS. rov JlEV oOv anov8a(ov a.UOvs nvas ipwra, rov 8i 7rat8tKov ov8iv 
KWAV&t 8t&AB&tv" ("son ofHipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and 
also a facetious explanation of both these names; the serious explanation is not to be had 
from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one") (406b8-c3). We are 
forced to ask why is it that Socrates cannot give the serious explanation? What is it that 
prevents him giving that, but does not prevent him attempting play? One answer may lie 
in his lack of knowledge in this area as expressed earlier at 384c l. Perhaps Socrates is 
giving the one drachma course, and the fifty drachma one would be serious. But, I feel, 
the fifty drachma course would be not as much use, perhaps even dangerous, because it 
would express itself as truth. If there is no truth to be discovered by studying[ ovoJlara, 
as will become clear, then anything that charges fifty drachma for admission and then 
professes to be serious is nothing but a confidence trick. Socrates cannot give a serious 
explanation of etymologies because he does not believe that a true one, one which will 
lead to a better understanding of the world, exists. Sophists may give them, and they may 
charge a good deal, and they may both believe that they are right and convince others, but 
those who believe them are those who only listen, not those who think and enter into 
dialogue. 
However, all this time Socrates has been arguing against the theory that all names are 
merely conventional. But his ar&rument is ironic, as we will see when he argues against 
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Cratylus' and seems to adopt the view that language itself holds no answers; that it has no 
connection to any truth. Socrates is being playful, but within this game there is a point: 
one can use language to argue any position if one is clever enough because language is 
different from the truth. Socrates is not being solemn and serious, and if he happens to 
chance upon something that is right in his playful etymologies then he has still proved 
nothing. Superficially, Socrates argues against conventionalism in language: in fact, he 
shows that language is unreliable and open to abuse and not to be taken seriously in itself 
They have to use it to study abstracts as best they can. This cannot be done through 
looking at language, but any study of abstracts, unfortunately, has to be carried out in 
language. Plato does not want to find the language to explain why language has its 
problems, this might be seen as a self defeating argument4 and would certainly be very 
difficult, but rather wants to demonstrate these problems in order to engage the reader. In 
this way, the reader cannot simply read Plato's views on language and believe he 
understands them, but must actively think about what Socrates says and in this way 
approach an understanding of the concepts that Plato wants to get across. Plato's ideas on 
language are conveyed through an understanding, however minimal, of what lies behind 
Socrates' words and tone, rather than merely a reading of the words themselves. 
Both interlocutors seem aware of the game that Socrates is playing. At 407c8-9 
Hermogenes says "tClVOVV£V£l, iav J.HJnri aoz, ills S0l1(£V, in aM.n 8o~n" ("that is 
very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head") after Socrates has 
given his explanation ofHephaestus coming from "l/Jasos tOTopa" (the lord of light). He 
knows that Socrates' statements are suggestions, guesses and games, but that this does 
4 This may be Cratylus' idea, as explained below. 
19 
not necessarily mean that he is not getting at some truth. Just because it is said in playful, 
potentially ironic tones, does not mean there is no wisdom to be found within if, and 
Hermogenes seems to appreciate this. This whole escapade is in the tradition of Zeno and 
his Achilles and the tortoise game: everyone knows that Achilles will catch the tortoise, 
but the language game 'proves' that he can't and so gets at some truth concerning 
language and its essential difference from reality. Socrates' reply, "aM.' (va J..n]8o~n. 
rov "Ap1J ipdna" ("to prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares") 
( 407c 1 0), is in itself playful, and shows that he wants to carry on with this game for at 
least a while yet. Socrates, however, when he has had enough of the gods and wants to 
move on to other words, emphasises that this game has a target at "ncpt 8i aMa>v 
c1vnvcov f3ouA£z npof3aW J..lOL, 'ol/Jpa 'l81Jat oiot' Eu9UljJpovos ''innOL"' ("ask about 
anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds ofEuthyphro can prance") (407d7-
9). He wants to expose the 'inspiration' he has from the etymologist to show what the 
driving force behind (or in front of) these etymologies really is- a satirical attack on 
anyone who believes there is wisdom to be found in the study of etymology. 
Hermogenes explicitly introduces an important concept with "ouKouv EVJ..l1JXavos ri 
EiJ..LL A.Oyou" ("for I am not a good hand at speeches") (408b5-6). Liddell and Scott 
translate EVJ..l1JXavos as "skilful in contriving", "ingenious" or "inventive" when in 
relation to persons, but Socrates will demonstrate what this word refers to. There is a 
sinister undertone to this word. The implication seems to be either that using language 
involves necessarily twisting it and producing something out of it or with it, it has to be 
5 I cannot help but wonder what Plato would have thought of a painter such as Miro at this point. 
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worked in an inventive way, or that to be good at language one has to be able to work it 
in an inventive, contriving manner: adding or changing meaning and being clever with 
the intricacies. The idea that Socrates rixv17lies in language is explored later. 
The problematic nature of language is touched upon just after the issue of it being part of 
a skill one can use, a tool of a trade, is brought up. At 408c2-3, Socrates says "oiaOa on 
0 A.Oyos ro nav aT]JlalVcl ICal ICVICAEliCal 7rOAEl acl, #Cat lan Ol7rAoVS, &Arylh]s re #Cat 
11fcvorys" ("you know that speech makes all things known and always makes them 
circulate and move about, and is twofold, true and false"). Both Jowett and the Loeb 
translate "A.Oyos" as speech, so that it seems speech can signify everything, which would 
have to include Forms. But it is A.Oyos that can aTJJlalVcl (indicate towards?) ro nav. 
Aoyos, of course, extends to embrace so many ideas that speech specifically does not 
have to be able describe Forms, but perhaps argument, rationality or even thought can 
without speech. But then Plato exploits this complexity and ambiguity and prompts his 
reader to examine it, by saying that A.Oyos circulates and turns everything. The thing 
itself seems to be affected by its own communication so that it is spun around by the very 
act of communicating itself by A..Oyos. It mutates in the process of being said, read or 
even thought, and yet there remain only two categories, true and false. There is a correct 
and an incorrect A..Oyos, but still A..Oyos seems to be in a constant state of churning. 
There follows an extended joke to demonstrate just how problematic, even deceptive, 
language can be: "oVICOVV ro JlEV aAT10is avrov AELOV ICal eclOV ICal avw OLICOVV iv 
rois OcOlS J ro OE ljfcVOOS ICclf(l) iv roi's 7rOAAolS rmv av(}pwnwv ICal rpax)J ICat 
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rpayucov· ivravOa yap TrMtOTOl oi J1V00t 're Kat ra l/f£VD1J iariv, Trcpt rov rpaytKOV 
fJ{ov" ("is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above 
among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat 
of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, 
and tragedy is the place of them") ( 408c5-9). There is ironic rhetoric with the rhyming of 
"N:Iov Kat Oc'iov" and the exaggerated alliteration of"Kat rpaxv Kat rpaytKov". 
Whilst the gist of what is said Plato thought was along the right lines, in that up is good 
and divine, whereas down is human and tainted, Socrates is made to be ironic to prove a 
point. He is cVJ11JXavos, he can play with language and tone so that he can dress up what 
he says with rhetorical skill to make it appear more appealing. The skin that is the style 
bears a significance over the substance of what is said. But being cVJ17JXavos in speech 
does not make US wise with regard to ra KaAa. This is the explanation of the joke that is 
to follow. 
What does rpaytKOS really mean? It describes the life of J1V0ot and l/fcV81J where it 
seems to carry a conventional meaning, but then Socrates declares "opOws ... 'llav 
aino.Ws' cl.q" ("rightly ... Pan is the goat-herd")( cll-d 1 ). The joke lies in a pun on 
rpaytKOS also meaning goat-like, because rpaycp8{a has come to mean tragedy, but 
originally, and literally, means goat song (rpayos means goat, and cf>81] means song)6. 
This pun shows how simple it is for language to deceive, intentionally or not. It is also, 
once pointed out, a fairly simple example of the progression of meaning in language, 
because the great tradition of tragedy which one first assumes Socrates is referring to is a 
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long way from anything to do with goats. The language has grown and taken on new 
meaning. An example in English might be to ask whether a left handed person can be 
dextrous. But what is the true meaning of rpaycp8ia, tragedy or goat-song? Plato makes it 
mean both, using its modem meaning to describe human life at c6-9, and its roots to 
make his point about the problems inherent in a living language. Language is not precise, 
but is malleable. It attempts to stand for absolute things, but when it comes to things such 
as ra KaM, it cannot. They are divine and perfect: language is human and imperfect. But 
this joke also points out that language is not an arbitrary thing either: the language that 
Socrates and Hermogenes are arguing in has not just been invented, but has evolved. 
Language is a constant movement, connected to its history. But this does not mean that 
an understanding of its history will reveal truth to us. We can and indeed should be aware 
of language's history, but must understand that truth is separated from it. Socrates can 
show this so adeptly because he is so skilled in the use of language. If his trade is in 
di~ogue, then his tool is language and his rixv7J lies in using it. 
The etymologies continue, but when nvp is brought up, Socrates claims he cannot give 
any etymology because "ro '7rVp' anopro· Kat KlVDVVt:Ut:l ijrOL -q rov EvBUl/Jpovos JlS 
Jwvaa imJ.zA.otnivat, ii rovro n nayxaA£nov t:Tvat" ("I am at a loss to explain 7rVp; 
either the muse ofEuthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the 
word") (409dl-3). He has run out of ideas on how to give an etymology, and uses the 
opportunity to point out again that what he is saying is not his own, but is inspired by an 
etymologist. The playful nature of the conversation is pointed out in the very next line 
6 The reasons given for the progression of meaning range from the first actors wearing goat-skins, to there 
being goat-skins as prizes in theatrical contests, or as a reference to sacrifices made when theatre was a 
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"CJK~I.pat o(}v Tiv ~taayco J.11}'laV'rJV errt navra ra 'fOtaUra a av anopm" ("please, 
however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this 
sort") (409d3-4). We are about to be shown just how well Socrates can use a "J11JXavr}v", 
but by pointing out the trick, he attacks Euthyphro and his sort, hinting that they use 
tricks and are not always etymologising from any basis of fact. His get out is to say that 
the word is foreign, and therefore cannot be talked about in the Greek language. This 
aiJows Socrates to play with those words for which he can find an etymology or two, but 
discard those he cannot. There is not necessarily any truth behind this J11JXavr], it is just 
what Socrates adopts when he is stuck. This looks like an admission that Socrates is 
making it aiJ up on the spot, and can use the Muse of Euthyphro as his inspiration for 
these etymologies which themselves are not aimed at individual truths as to the 
etymologies of the individual words, but are rather pointed at a larger truth about 
language, how it works and how it can be worked. 
Socrates rounds off this section ofthe etymologies with a ring structure by referring again 
to Zeus, and then saying "noppco ifc51J, oiJlaz, l/JaEvoJlaz aolfJEas iA.avv~tv" ("you think, 
perhaps, that these are daring flights of wisdom") ( 410e3). This is both ironic, in that 
Socrates does not believe what he has been saying was truly wise, but also meant in 
earnest to the extent that he has already identified the major problems with language 
which will become more explicit later: its nature that is deceptive and necessarily 
different from the truth it is meant to describe. 
more religious experience. 
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Heracleitus becomes more heavily involved: "Kat Jl~V, V~ rov Kuva, OOKW yi JlOl ov 
KaKiOs pavreueaOat, 0 Kat vuv8~ ivevo7Jaa, on oi navu naA<Xwt avOpronot oi 
nOipevot ra ovopara navros paJ.J...ov, roanep Kat rwv vuv oi 1r0Mot rwv aol/Jwv 
V7r0 fOU 7rVKVa 7reptarpEl/Jea0at ra 7rpaypara Kat 1rtlVfWS' l/JEpea(}ar ainwvrat 0~ OV 
ro lv8ov ro napa alfl[mv n&Oos a1nov dvat rauf1Js rijs 8os1Js, aM.a aura ra 
npaypara ovrro nel/JVKEVat, ov8ev avrwv J10VLJ10V etvat OVOE {3Ef3awv, aMa perv 
Katl/JEpeaOat Kat peara etvat 1rtl01]S' l/Jopas Kat yeviaeros ae{" ("by the dog of Egypt 
I believe that the notion which came into my head just now was not ill founded; that is, 
that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modem 
philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from 
constantly going round and round and moving in all directions; and this appearance, 
which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; 
they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flu.x and motion, and that the 
world is always full of every sort of motion and change") ( 411 b3-c6). But this is not only 
a satire on Heracleitus and his followers' methods, saying that because their arguments 
go around and around, they get dizzy and see everything else going around and around. It 
also explicitly points out that if Socrates is in any way or at any time right in his 
etymologising then the greek language is itself based on a fallacy. If the philosophy of 
those original "pereropoJ..Oyot .. .Kat a8oAiaxat" ("idle chatteres and talkers" [my 
translation])( 40 1 b8-9), who, for the purposes of this argument at least, created language, 
was misguided, then there is another reason why we cannot rely on language as a route to 
discovering truth: not only is truth different from language, but also that language which 
may be meant, in some sense, to represent that truth, has been based on a philosophy that 
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does not take account of the consistent and eternal nature of ra KaAd. This does not 
mean we cannot use it, of course. We have to use it, since it is our only method of 
communicating ideas about those most important things, but we have to be careful that 
we keep it as our tool and do not allow it to become our master. All this etymologising 
reveals the truth about nothing but language, because that is all the study of language can 
ever do. 
With this idea in the forefront of his mind, Socrates gives a speech etymologising some 
'important' words assuming that they derive from a belief in flux ( 4lld4-412d2). 
Wpov7JmS comes from either "qJOpas .. xai pov vo7Jms" ("perception of motion and 
flux") or f/Jopas OV1JalS ("the blessing of motion"); YVWJLTJ is from "yovijs ... vwpnmv" 
("the consideration of generation"); VOTJalS is "v£ov ... £ms" ("the desire of the new"); 
amf/JpoaUv7J is "amf1]pia ... f/Jpov-t}a£ms" ("the salvation of wisdom"); bncmjp7J is from 
"brop£v7Js"7 because the wise soul follows the motion of things; aUv£ms comes from 
"avvz£vaz" to mean the soul goes along with things; aofjJia is apparently "s£vzKwr£pov" 
("rather foreign"), which was Socrates' Jl7Jlav-t} for escaping words he can not 
etymologise, so his explanation involving a man called .Eovs (literally meaning "Rush") 
and "irraf/Jryv" ("a touching") does not carry much conviction; aya8ov is from 
"ayaarov" and "Ooos" because swiftness is admirable. The problem over aof/J{a is 
presumably a joke, because Socrates cannot find an etymology for it, and instead has to 
resort to what he has admitted is nothing but a clever trick. Plato's view of those who call 
themselves aof/Jos is clear: even the word they use to describe themselves is based on a 
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fallacy. We are not meant to read a passage such as this and then believe that we know 
these words' etymologies. The point is much wider. Socrates can find these etymologies 
working from the basis that language has developed from Heracleitean tendencies: if it 
has, then it can teach us nothing; if it has not, then it can be bent so easily to demonstrate 
a point that is not true, that we can never really trust it. We cannot find the answers to the 
most important questions by just looking at what previous generations thought, either in 
what they wrote or in the language itself in which they wrote. The truth does not lie in 
words. 
Then he moves on to 8tKatooUV1J. This gets the lion's share ofthe speech, from 412c7-
413d2. Socrates claims that he learnt 8fKawv is so called because it is the cause of all 
things. 8 He then confuses both his teacher and himself with questions and being 
questioned. The conclusion is that, despite being "nom EV 1fAELOVl anopf~" ("in a far 
greater perplexity") ( 413c8) than before he set off on his inquiry into 8tKatooUV1J, he still 
stands by his etymology. The confusion has arisen because the nature of what was being 
explored changed. When it was just the name, there was no problem, but as soon as the 
argument moved onto what 8tKatooUV1J actually was, and what therefore was 8fKatov, 
then Socrates encountered apparently unanswerable problems. He was told it was to do 
with the sun, fire, heat and mind, but could make sense of none of them. This section 
seems as though it could have been written in response to someone who said: "if you 
7 This will become significant when Socrates is talking to Cratylus, and makes it as much to do with 
stopping as moving. 
8 He learnt this "iv anopp~TOIS" ("in secret" or "in forbidden circumstances") which l believe must be 
significant, but do not myself have any idea why. Some suggest that it refers to Prodicus' course on names 
and is ironic, or it may be Socrates toying with Hermogenes, suggesting to him, and of course the reader, 
that Socrates knows more than he is letting on. 
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want to know what DllcaLOaUV1J means, then just examine the word." The point is, 
however, that the word is different from the thing, and their connection at best obscure, at 
worst based on an obscure error. It is the concept that the word refers to that both matters 
and is hardest to understand. Those who etymologise know no more about the nature of 
the meaning of a word, what it is that that word refers to, after a 'successful' etymology 
than they did before. Knowledge of the word and its roots in no way equates to 
knowledge of the concept of which that word is a label. As Plato will show towards the 
end of the dialogue ( 439d3-440c l) it is the essence ·of justice precisely not to be in flux 
because it, along with all other 'Forms', is permanent. Anyone who says that because 
8ucaLOaUV1J includes "8ta" or any other word of motion it must be to do with motion is 
approaching the subject from the wrong angle. The 'Form' is permanent, the word is just 
a human, and therefore inevitably flawed, construct used to represent that idea which no-
one can satisfactorily define. Socrates can stick by his etymology, but cannot trust it to 
reveal anything about the true nature of justice. The etymology may even be right, but it 
teaches us nothing about what DllcaLOaUV1J is. 
Immediately after this rather confusing speech, Plato gives his reader a reminder of the 
tone of the discussion: "EPM: lj>aivn Jl.Ol, (h EroKparss, ravra JlEV aiC1JKOSVaL rov Kat 
' ' ~ I I ~ \ .J .. 'l I) ,... ' I V ~ I '' \ V ovK avroazsutasstv. En: n us rU/VI.U; EPM: ov navv. En: aKovs u1J· taros yap av 
as Kat ra smA.oura il;anad,aaLJ.ll ros OVK aK1JKOWS Aiyro" ("HERM: I think, Socrates, 
that you are not improvising now; you must have heard this from someone else. SOC: 
And not the rest? HERM: Hardly. SOC: Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making 
you believe in the originality of the rest."( 413d3-8). This indicates two related things. 
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There is an intellectual conquest game going on between Socrates and Hermogenes. It is 
a playful power struggle as much as a conversation aimed at truths- although that would 
be a trump card to win, or indeed beat, any trick. But both "avroaxs8u1~stv" and 
"s;anan}aal/.ll" show that the interlocutors are here aware of, and interested in, the 
tricks that Socrates is creating. This is also a reminder that one cannot just listen (or 
read), one must think. If the reader takes the dialogue at purely face value because they 
do not think about what they are reading, they will do worse than learn nothing, they will 
be deceived. The reader must consider the words and the tone, and then what they mean 
together to learn anything. 
Socrates continues this self-conscious talk at "a..U.' ov yap smCJKoniis JlE OJ(J7rsp stcros 
8pOJ10V </JspOJlEVOV EtrEt8av k[ov mv..&f3roJ1at" ("pray observe how I gallop away 
when I get on smooth ground") ( 414b2-4 ). This is a peculiar metaphor. If he is not 
running on the course, he is not taking part in the race properly, he is cheating and cannot 
'win' because he'll never have a finishing line to cross. He may cover the distance 
quickly, but he won't really achieve anything. There is another chariot race metaphor at 
420d3, and we have already come across the reference to Socrates being pulled by 
Euthyphro's horses. These metaphors are, as Baxter puts it, "hardly the paradigms of 
orderly motion. "9 Socrates is racing through , with no particular order or method, but is 
making it up on the spot, trying to get through as many words as he can, almost as a 
competition with himself. In this example there is the possibility that "kiov" might be 
picking up "kl'ov Kai Os'iov" of 408c5-9. If it is then there is the further ingredient here 
9 Baxter, The Cratylus: Plato's Critique ofNaming, Leiden, 1992, page 90. 
29 
that although Socrates is not 'on course', he is dealing in the smooth and divine, and 
therefore getting towards truth. Perhaps truth can be reached by running along the track, 
but it would take too long (longer than our lifetimes), so Socrates cheats and runs outside 
the track. Perhaps only those capable of giving Hermogenes a serious answer can run 
along the track, but Socrates knows that he does not know the truth and is only capable of 
play and running outside the track. He can be playful with his etymologies, rather than 
professing to be serious. But while Socrates is getting at some truth, even if it is just the 
ambiguities and difficulties of language, those who think they succeed and believe they 
are really in the race for the truth about language, or have even won it, are severely 
mistaken. 
A good example of Socrates' play having a greater truth about it is his etymology of 
rixvr1 at 4l4b7-c2. He makes it come from "lfstv vou" because the possession of the 
mind explains the dzvry: "oUICOUV rouro YE &gv vou 01]J.IalVEL, ro J.LEV rau acpd..Ovn, 
ipf3a.AOvn 8i o!3 J.LEralfJ rou XEliCaL rou vU ICal rou i}ra;"("that may be identified 
with izovory, and express the possession of mind: you only have to take away the rand 
insert two o's, one between the x and v, and another between the v and ry") (414bl0-c2). 
It is surely significant that rizvry has this rather ridiculous etymology c1aimed for it. Here 
Socrates has attempted an explanation of what the word might mean, but has presented it 
as a joke etymology. The linguistic side is ridiculous, the concept side more interesting 
and believable: he who has a rizvry has his mind possessed. But there is a much broader 
play. Socrates, with a nice irony, demonstrates his rizvry in argument by persuading 
Hermogenes of a rather unbelievable etymology of rizvry itself. The truth of the word 
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itself is nothing when compared to what the word tries to represent, and the truth 
surrounding the words. 
Socrates makes it explicit that Herrnogenes should not examine the individual 
etymologies too hard, but should look for something else with "aMd Jlry J.Jav, w 
OatpovLE, clKfJtf3oA.oyou 'Jlrl Jl' anoyuuoa,'1S pevsos"' ("but do not be too much of a 
precisian, or 'you will unnerve me ofmy strength"') (414e2-415a2). Socrates' strength 
comes not from the detail of his etymologies, but from the wider principle that no truth 
about the world will be found in etymologies, only truth about language. Socrates puts 
forward some potential etymologies for us to ponder, but the heart of what he says is that 
words themselves contain no truths, but merely stand for them in communication. 
At 415a3 Socrates wants to etymologise J11Jlavr}. His explanation is that JlijKos (length) 
is added to avstv (to accomplish) because JlryKos is nearly the same as "ro 1roi.V" ("the 
many/greatest/much") (a5-6). However length is not similar to much in any sense other 
than that they are both quantitive, but they refer to different things, distance and number. 
They nearly mean the same thing, but they do not. It is no coincidence that Socrates pulls 
this trick on the word J11Jlavr}. Socrates demonstrates what the word means by 
deliberately toying with a suspect etymology of it- its meaning comes not from its 
etymology but rather the way Socrates goes about the word's etymology. 
Having shown he is EUJlrJlavos, Socrates declares that he wants to move on to apsrr} 
(virtue) and Kwaa (vice) (415a9-bl) because he is at "the summit of his inquiries" ("ri,v 
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Kopvl/JT,v ... rmv slpTJJ-lEVmv") ( a8-9). Yet their etymologies are so unsatisfactory that 
Hermogenes pulls Socrates up on them. First, Socrates claims he knows nothing about 
apsnj (a9-bl ). Instead he talks about KaK[a in terms of KaKWS tov (going badly) (b3), 
then justifies it because 8stA1a (cowardice) comes from &apos (chain) and &t (it is 
necessary) put together with A-fav (strength), and arrop[a (difficulty) comes from a (not) 
plus rropwsafJat. Therefore, still on the motion image, KaKta must be to do with lack of, 
or wrong, motion (b3-c9). This gives Socrates the idea that apsnf must come from good 
Or permanent motion: a shortened form of a£tp£tTT] ( d4 ), which itself comes from "ast 
piov" ("always flowing") ( d3). However, he invites the attack with "Kat lOWS J-lS av 
l/Jr,asts rrAc.lrrstv" ("I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine") 
(4l5d5-6). 
This elicits what can only be described as the right response from Hermogenes: "ro 8& 
8ry 'KaKov,' 8t' oO rroUU rmv sprrpoafJsv £lpT]KaS, rt av voo/ wvvopa;" ("but what 
is the meaning of~ea~eov, which has played so great a part in your previous discourse") 
( 416al-2). Socrates based everything on his explanation of KaKta as coming from 
KaKos, without ever touching on KaKOS itself, but accepting it as a root in itself. But 
why, we must ask, is it only here that this behaviour is questioned? It is at its most 
obvious here because KaK- is the same root for both words, but in the other etymologies 
Socrates never explains the roots of the sometimes rather long words he condenses and 
uses as roots. It must be significant, even if little more than a neat authorial twist, that it is 
when talking about badness that this rottenness is finally exposed by Hermogenes. 
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Socrates is rather stumped. He calls an end to this section of the game with "ch01rov n 
v1} Llta ipoty£ OOK£l Kat xa.Mm)v avpf3aA£iv. imlyw oov Kat rovrcp SKclVTfV r1}v 
JlTfxavryv" ("that is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and 
therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious device") ( 4l6a3-4). The contrivance is 
the trick of saying it is of foreign origin. Socrates cannot think of or imagine a root for 
KaKos and so must stop the game. No claim to truth is made but the use of rr}v J1TfXav1}v 
must be considered. It is ironic in that Socrates' trick is not clever at all and is given no 
further thought, but it is its dismissal from the conversation by Hermogenes that is 
important. If "Kat iotKas Y£ opews A.iyovn" ("very likely you are right") ( 4l6a7) is 
ironic then both parties are aware of the irony of J1TfXav1}v and are consciously playing 
this game, aware of the hollow nature of sophistic trickery, how an argument can be won 
with an undefended proposition and well timed 11TfXav1} so that an audience is 
bamboozled with words. If, however, it is to be taken literally, then Socrates' sophistry 
exposes Hermogenes as a fool. That we cannot tell exposes the unreliable nature of 
language. In just reading, we cannot know whether Hermogenes the character 
'understands' in this :fiction and is being ironic, or whether the character is serious and it 
is only the author, Plato, who is being ironic. The interpretation of the character's tone 
and intent is left entirely to the reader, who may have to bring knowledge from other 
parts of this text or even from other texts in order to try an work out what Plato might 
mean by getting his characters to say what they do. 
At 416b7-d ll there is the discussion concerning KaMv, with some intense and detailed 
word play. Socrates parallels "Karavoijaat" (to understand, perceive) (b8) with "rijs 
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8tavo[as" (understanding) (bll), so that while KaMv is hard to get one's intellect 
around, it also means just that, intellect. But both words are rooted in vovs (mind), and 
their similarity and distinction is made clear by the Kara and ow. So here in this game, 
beauty is the intellect which finds itself so hard to understand- understanding 
' 
understands other things but riot itself. The proof that KaMv equals mind is wonderful, 
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and proves that Socrates is definitely ev,w]zavos. Each thing is named because it has a 
principle, a power, something to do ( c 1-2) and that power is 8u1vata of gods or men or 
both (c4-5). At c7-8, the pun on ICaAoVV is brought into play with "oVICOVV ro ICaA.iaav 
ra npaypara ICaL ro ICaAov~ ravrov ianv rovro, 8tavow" ("and that which called 
and calls things by their names, is, once again, the mind"). By using the aorist for the 
original namer and the presen~ for us who still call by name, Plato can bring out the 
similarity between KaA.ovv and KaAOV to link calling with beauty on a purely linguistic 
level. The difficulties of puns' and near puns and their understanding, because the reader 
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may not know in what way to. understand the word, have been admirably proved by 
various editors of the Cratylus confusing and emendating ICaAovv for ICaAOV (Badharn 
c7) and ICaAOV for KaAoVV (Bumet d4). Plato's baffling argument to help us Karavoelv 
8tavatav (perceive perception) has led interpreters to question the text, that is the wo 
rds and language, and play with it to try and make it mean something or something else. 
The pun is at its most confusing at d4. Plato has just gone through a fairly standard, if 
rather abstract, analogy that medical power performs medic~l work and that the power of 
carpentry performs the work of carpentry. The rixv11 in the person carrying out the task 
is associated with that task's power or principle, and so when "ro KaA.ovv!KaAOv apa 
ICaAa" ("the principle of beauty/calling does the work of beauty"), the rixv1J associated 
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with making beautiful things is either beauty itself, or the ability to call something 
something. 
But this confusion sorts itself out. At d6, ro KaAOV is confirmed as 8u1voza, because as 
agreed at c4-5 mind gives names and the association between KaA.ovv and KaAa via 
KaA.Ov is now entrenched. The only difference between KaA.ovv and KaMv is the 'u' that 
sneaks in, and Plato has already decided that for the sake of this game at least, or perhaps 
more seriously, that letters can come and go (399a6-9). He sees the two words as 
practically the same, or at least so much like each other that they must be around a central 
source. Neither word is 'right', but they both float around beauty in linguistic appearance. 
At 41 7e6-4 1 8a1' Hennogenes says "noud.Aa ri aOL, (1 LWK"pares, EK/3aivez ra 
ovopara" ("what intricate names you come up with, Socrates"). Herrnogenes seems to 
be gently goading Socrates, especially with what follows about pipes and Athena. 
Socrates says that it is not his fault that the words are as they are but the words makers'. 
However, Hennogenes seems to be pointing out that it is Socrates who is making the 
words come from his suggested etymologies, rather than definitely finding their real ones. 
This is shown when Socrates gives two explanations of~flipa (day): that it is from 
"ipdpw" ("desire") because men desire the light ( 418c9-d2); or it is to do with "Tff1epos" 
("gentle") because the day makes things so ( 418d4-5). Hennogenes agrees that both 
explanations could be given by people with "</Jaiveraz" ("so it seems" [my translation]) 
( 418d3) and "8oKei f10L" ("it seems so to me" [my translation]) ( 418d6). It is impossible 
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to say whether he is assenting to one or the other, because it might seem to him that 
Socrates first explanation is correct, or he might just be saying that it could appear that 
way; or Socrates' second explanation might seem correct to him, but he also may just be 
agreeing with Socrates that there are people who think that; or he might just be agreeing 
with everything Socrates is saying because he knows that none of these etymologies is 
anything other than, at best, a possibility10. For example, Socrates says 8iov (obligation) 
is similar to 8eOJ10S (chain), but if this is its root, then it goes against the principle of 
naming that Socrates is using, which is that things to do with the good have an etymology 
that reflects Heracleitean flux. But he saves himself and his 'rules' by making it come 
from an ancient form ,8rov, which is connected to 8uov, which is to do with the good. 
Socrates is thinking and speaking on the spot; he is coming up with whatever answers he 
can find; we are not to take what he says as any sort of well thought out theory, but rather 
an improvised inte11ectual game. 
Hermogenes asks Socrates to etymologise &J~a (opinion), which he does at 420b6-c9. 
Socrates puts forward two possible explanations: that it comes from 8iw~rs (pursuit), 
because the soul goes in pursuit of knowledge; or that it derives from ro~ov (bow), 
because opinion is like hitting the target. Socrates favours the ro~ov idea, but does not 
say it is definitely that rather than the other, again it just seems that way ("cpaiverar" 
(c5)). So, on the etymology of 8o~a, Socrates has no definite truth to propose, but two 
10 At Timaeus 45b4-6, Timaeus has the eyes filled with a gentle (t/KiJs ifpEpov) fire that is akin to daylight, 
so that the two can 'combine' to allow the soul to see. This is playful, but nevertheless clearly connects the 
two. This might be taken to give a hint at which etymology Plato preferred, but the point is not the 
etymology, whose correctness is irrelevant, but rather the metaphorical connection so that the light of day, 
when we can see things more clearly, is more agreeable than the darkness of the night: the light of 
knowledge is better than the darkness of ignorance. But none of this is serious. 
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alternative options, both of which are appropriate. Llim~ts has the idea of going in the 
right direction, and ro~ov is about hitting upon truth, but not knowing why it is true. 
Socrates expresses no knowledge as to which etymology is true, both are meant as ideas 
getting towards knowledge and both are oo~at. Therefore Socrates cannot settle on one in 
favour of the other and both have equal status. In this way, Socrates can very cleverly 
define &:>~a through giving examples of what oo~at are, but does not necessarily say 
anything constructive on its etymology. Rather he searches for the meaning of the word. 
He cannot get away from looking towards the ideas behind the words. 
At 421a6-bl, he makes ovo11a derive from "ov oo w10J.Ia ianv" ("that for which there 
is a search"), which is seen more clearly in the adjective ovoJ1aar6v (notable). But this is 
another joke. The dialogue up to this point has been a playful search for the etymologies 
of words, the reason why ovoJ.lara are as they are. Now we are told that ovo11a itself 
means that which is searched for. The ovoJ.la has always been the object of this search, 
so in this context, that is exactJy what ovoJ.la has come to mean. Socrates is being 
ironical and WJ11}xavos: the etymolO!,'Y is a joke that demonstrates how words can be 
abused to 'show' whatever the speaker wants to. 
But when it gets to words concerning matters of importance, Socrates demonstrates little 
with their etymologies. At 42lbl-cl, he deals quickly with a.Al}Ot:ta (truth), which 
apparently comes from "Ot:la a.Arf" meaning divine wandering, and ro ov (being), which 
is just i6v (going) without the 't'. They are very important words, indeed the concepts 
they stand for are the focal points of philosophy. It is not surprising if Socrates passes 
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over the words and their meanings without trying to define or demonstrate them because 
that would just not be possible since abstracts such as these defy language and cannot be 
captured in it. There is no point in going into detail about these words, because it is the 
concepts that matter, concepts which cannot be revealed in a short and witty joke. 
There follows a section where Plato explains, in a way, this whole section of essentially 
satirical etymologies. Socrates admits that what has proceeded was not to be taken at face 
value with "gv J..l~V rolvvv apn 1WV bcoptaaJ..ld}a WaTt; OOKF:;tV Tl A..iystv 
aJCOKplVOJ..lcVOt" ("one way of giving·the appearance of an answer has already been 
suggested") (42lc9-10). This is a remarkably 'cynical' sentence for Socrates to utter, 
especia1ly with the 'invention' aspect of rrop{(w. But the answer wi11 only ever be an 
appearance of an answer because no real answer as to the meaning of the word will be 
found in etymology, only an answer that is itself about language rather than concepts. It 
would look like an answer; it would get towards answering 'what does x mean?', but is s 
a long way from answering 'what actua11y is x?' 
At 422al-b9, Socrates explains that once one finds a word that cannot be broken down 
into other words, one must stop trying to do so and accept that word as a "mozxslov", an 
element. EtymolO!,'Y is no longer a possible tool of 'investigation', so another method has 
to be found. Socrates says "t:iA.A..d 11T,v J>v ys vvv 8tcA1JAV(}apsv rwv ovoJ..larwv ry 
op(}oT7JS rotaVTl] ns i{Jovkro dvaz, Ota 01JAoVV otov gKamov ian TWV ovrwv" 
("but now in the explanation we have just completed, names were judged correct 
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according to their power to show what each thing is like") (422dl-3). As the conclusion 
of the dialogue with Hermogenes starts, Socrates points out that what has been said is 
particular to this conversation: names have been judged correct if Socrates has made their 
etymologies reveal a Heracleitean flux in the essence of the thing that word stands for. 
But Plato does not believe that everything flows: there are eternal constants 11 . The 
criterion for judging the correctness of a name has been incorrect: the correctness of 
language has been 'shown' from what language has been made to 'reveal', rather than 
language's etymological correctness being judged against the results of an examination of 
the universe. An examination of language carried out in language reveals nothing that is 
positive, only: a) language may have some Heracleitean tendencies in its roots; but more 
importantly, b) language can be manipulated to reveal anything as long as its manipulator 
is skilful enough. 
The argument progresses to cover the idea that the namer in some sense imitates 
something in naming: "oVOJl' ap' ianv, Ws EolKE, JllJ11JJ1a f/Jrovfi iKElVOV 0 JllJlElral, 
#Cat OVOJlaf;El 0 Jli/LOVJlEVoS rfi lj>rovfi 0 av JllJlijrat" ("then a name is, it seems, a vocal 
imitation of any object; and a man is said to name any object when he imitates it with the 
voice" [Jowett's italics]) (423b9-ll). Then Socrates argues at 423cl-9 that actually that is 
not the case, because if it were, then a man imitating an animal would necessarily also be 
naming it. He set a trap for Hermogenes which he fell straight into. The trick is that 
Socrates can take two different meanings of"J1LJ1EOJ1at", one to mean represent in an 
abstract sense, and the other to mean to do a literal impression of This in itself exposes 
some problems with language, because the meaning has shifted over the space of just a 
11 See 439d3-6. 
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few lines without any warning. It sounded reasonable at the introduction when it seemed 
to carry a more metaphorical sense, but ridiculous when it had its literal sense imposed 
upon it. The word ptJ.1£lrat seems to be able to 'reflect' two things at once. There are two 
similar, but ditTerent, ideas which the one word stands for. A dissection of the word could 
not explain how it has its metaphorical sense as well as its literal one: for that we must 
look to the word's meaning not its roots. This means that Socrates' suggestion at 423e7-
10 bears no relevance to the Greek language that they are using: "d ns auro rouro 
J.llJl£la(}at OVVatTO EKaarov, TlJV ovaiav, YPclJ.lJ.laal T£ Kat avlla{3ais, dp' OVK av 
oryA.oi £~eaarov o &anv;" ("and if anyone could express that essence of each thing in 
letters and syllables, would he not express the real nature of each thing?"). He has just 
demonstrated how "pt.p&ia(}at" does not have one single essence for its letters to reflect, 
rather it has its precise meaning chosen for it by its context. Maybe there is the possibility 
of a language that works purely on the basis of a word's meaning being somehow 
expressed in that word itself 2, but the one they are using does not. In order for Socrates 
to be able to use ''J.llJ.l&ia(}at" meaningfully, he has had to set up a sort of convention with 
Hermogenes over what it is that they want it to mean in this context by dismissing its 
'doing an impression of meaning in favour of "express". This does not mean, of course, 
that all language is set up purely by convention: there is an historical background to 
language 13, but within that, conventions must be set up in communication for the sake of 
clarity: terms must be defined before a meaningful dialogue can take place 14. 
12 Although Socrates goes on to show that a perfect representational language is not possible with his two 
Cratyluses argument (432a8-d10). 
13 See the rpaycp&iv joke above 
14But there will always be those terms which are undefinable, those things that language cannot express in 
words and that cannot be found in etymology. 
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At 424b7-425a3 Socrates explains that he will end this exploration of language by 
looking at how crrozx&la, as either individual letters or syllables, can be put together to 
reflect the meaning of ra npwra ow5Jlara (the original names) in the very composition 
of ra npwra OVOJla'l"a. If there is not a method "aA.Aws 86 avvdpElV Jlry <PauA.ov n Kal 
ov KaO' o8ov" ("the composition of them will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong 
direction") (425b3-4). But he gives a disclaimer as to the worth of what is to follow about 
names: "ov8iv ELOO'l"ES ri]s aA1]0das ra rwv avOpwnwv 8oyJ1ara 7rEpl avrwv 
eiKasoJlEV" ("of the truth about them we know nothing, and do but entertain human 
notions of them") (425c2-3). 
At 425d1-426b2, Socrates starts his final speech to Hermogenes about how the sounds in 
language came to be used. He suggests that there are three "iK8va&tS ... JlaAa KOJllflat" 
("ingenious excuses") ( 426a2) which can be used as an avoidance of giving a real 
explanation: to do what oi rpaycp8onowi (tragic poets) do with their O&oz im ras 
J11JXavas (gods from the machines), and say that gods gave the earliest names so they are 
therefore just right; to say that the Greek language comes from foreigners; or to claim 
that antiquity has cast a veil over them. But at 426c 1-d 1 Socrates, in explaining the roots 
ofKLV1JOlS (motion), undercuts himself by claiming that it is from a foreign word, KLELV, 
and that the ancients used epsilon where modem Greek has an eta, as well as the word 
acquiring a nu. In the first word he examines after he has set out his own rules, Socrates 
clearly breaks one of them. But the words he uses are different: in the excuses, Socrates 
uses "f3apf3apot" to mean foreigner; but in his etymology, he does not use the adjective 
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f3ap{3aptKOS to mean foreign, but "~eVLKov". Bapf3aptKOS is probably more judgmental 
than ~evtKOS because it carries a meaning of 'uncivilised' rather than just a geographical 
foreigness, but in switching to the latter, Socrates is still referring to the idea 'foreign'. 
Hermogenes does not pull him up for this trick. This shows that we should not look at the 
letters of the words used, but the concepts to which they refer. Socrates, before this final 
section where he wiU talk about what crrozxe'la show about the word they are a part of, 
demonstrates that unless we think about what a word means, and do not concentrate only 
on the composition of a word, then we will not be able to use them properly. This has 
shown that two words can be used to mean the same thing and therefore should not be 
considered as very different, just as the earlier problems over JHJleraem show that the 
same word can be used to mean two different things. Finding out what a word means is 
different to finding out how a word has to come to be composed as it is. 
Socrates can get away with these tricks because he is so adept at using language; it is 
where his rixv11 lies. But none of his etymologising has been serious, it has all been 
playful suggestions that may have been right, but equally may not have been. He claims 
at 426a7-b3 "rov </Jamcovra 7repi avrwv !'e,lVlKOV etvm 7repl rwv npwrwv ovoparwv 
pcl.Atara re Kai KaOapwrara 8er &xelV ano8er~at, ij eO ei8ivm on ra ye uarepa 
~817 <fJJ..vapf,aet'' ("the. professor of the science of language should be able to give a very 
lucid explanation of the first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense 
about the rest"). Socrates has not given very clean and genuine explanations but neither 
has he talked nonsense. His skill in language has allowed him to demonstrate that an 
etymological knowledge is not what is important because what counts are not the words, 
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but the concepts behind the words. He has no etymological knowledge, only some 
guesses, and his emphasis on what words mean, rather than how they have developed, 
means that he can concentrate on ra KaM, rather than putting his faith in a language 
which, if his etymologies hit upon any truth, is based, at least to some degree, on a 
mistaken philosophy anyway. 
The explanation at 426d3-427dl ofthe way that sounds are the tongues' gestures and are 
meant to resemble, in a very abstract and symbolic way, certain ideas, seems reasonable. 
This is ditierent from an etymology, and requires no belief that the world can be revealed 
through the examination of words, only that some sounds in some words are used 
because the are onomatopoeic. It is sensible to suggest that p can be expressive of 
movement, or that there is a smoothness in A that, when a r is added to make r A, becomes 
sticky, even 'glutinous'. But this does not mean that language should be studied in order 
to find truth for two reasons: the original names may have been created in a mistaken 
belief~ and even if they were created well and in accordance with the way things are, we 
should try, as far as possible, to study the 'original' concepts rather than their linguistic 
representations. This sensible speech at the end of a playful performance by Socrates, 
supported by Hermogenes, does not rescue etymology and the study of words. It does 
indicate, however, that there is some method to naming and an evolution in names. They 
are not subject to the arbitrary will of someone who suddenly decides that a particular 
combination of sounds now means such-and-such, but neither are they vessels who will 
give up some truth about the world if only examined hard enough. Their history does not 
make them reliable, and if Socrates has stumbled on the method of their evolution, that is 
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Heracleitean flux, then any study of them will 'reveal' the world to be other than how 
Socrates believes it actually is. 
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Tbe argument witb Cratylus 
The argument starts with Socrates referring back to his own reference to Prodicus at 
384b3-c2 with "801(£lS yap J.lOl auras r£ E(JKE</JOat ra 'l"Olaura Kat nap' Clllmv 
Jl&J.1a07]KEVal. iav O~V Urns n KaA.A.lov' £va rmv Jla01JTWV 1r£pl op00'f1]!"0S 
OVOJ.la'l"COV Kat EJ.lE ypa</Jov" ("for you have evidently reflected On these matters and 
have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may 
count me in the number of your disciples") (428b2-5). The comparison is between 
Socrates and Cratylus and Prodicus, who both believe that "nap' &A.A.cov Jl&Jla01]Kivm" 
is good enough. Socrates is expecting a similar lecture to be replayed for him now, but 
this time, it will not just be heard, but wiJJ be questioned too. Cratylus responds by saying 
that he agrees with what Socrates has said, but he enters into the spirit of the dialogue by 
saying it in a playful way, comparing Socrates to the hero Ajax with a quote from the 
Tiiad (428c4-5). He refers to Socrates' joke concerning Euthyphronic inspiration, and 
adds that perhaps another Muse could be the cause of Socrates' outpouring. AJJ this goes 
to show that Cratylus has both been listening to what Socrates has been saying and that 
he has partially caught the tone, and also that in his arrogance he has misunderstood 
Socrates somewhat. Cratylus has assumed that, since Socrates was arguing against 
Hermogenes, Socrates therefore agrees with him, although we are as yet still not sure 
what it is that Cratylus does believe, only that he disagrees with Hermogenes. Cratylus 
has listened, but not thought. He has only heard what he wants to. He will soon learn that 
Socrates, despite arguing with Hermogenes, by no means agrees with Cratylus' position. 
Socrates' attack was against Hermogenes' extreme position that a private language, one 
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where names can be decided on at any time by anybody, is possible. His tactic was to 
assume a perfect language, where there is a clear and natural link between name and 
thing named. But as will become clear, Socrates no more agrees with that idea in reality 
than he does with Hermogenes' initially extreme position. 
At 428dl-2, Socrates wraps up the inspiration joke before moving on to the more serious 
argument with Cratylus. Socrates, as we know, knows nothing and yet appeared to give 
something like a doctrine in his conversation with Hermogenes, even if in fact he did not. 
Eo</Jos is such a dangerous word in Plato anyway, so it is no surprise to see it so close to 
cbnmw. As we have seen, Socrates has good reason not to trust what he calls aol/J{a, and 
here draws attention to its trickery and playful deception to prove the danger in the 
vagaries of language that can be abused by anyone with a rixvTJ in language. If Socrates 
does not trust what he said, then we certainly should not either. We should remember that 
Socrates' inspiration was Euthyphro, and that the whole section could, and I believe 
should, be read as a satirical attack on Euthyphro and anyone who believes in his ways, 
that is, anyone who puts too much trust in language. This can be seen by "ro yap 
61;,anaraa0ar avrov vl/J' avrou navrwv xaknwrarov" ("for the worst of all 
deceptions is self deception") (428d3-4). He must not let himself be deceived into taking 
his own satire seriously. Cratylus may have been taken in by it to the extent that he thinks 
Socrates is on his side, but Socrates must remember that Cratylus is still the enemy. Any 
satire is now over and it is time for a more serious argument. 
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It begins with the two agreeing that correct names are given by namers, who are 
operating within the rixv11 of name-giving. But the problem occurs over Hermogenes' 
name. Cratylus wants to claim that it is not merely a wrongly given name, because it does 
not describe Hermogenes' real character, but that it is therefore not his name at all. He 
should be called something else, something which reflects and instructs others on his 
character. That ovoJ.La and only that ovoJ.La would be his name. A word, even if everyone 
knows it to refer to the particular individual, even if it conjures up images and 
connections to do with that person in everyone who hears it, even if it is known as the 
tool of communication 'representing' that man, is not his name unless it describes him. 
This is Cratylus' position. 
This dialogue may have its difficulties because the starting ground for each interlocutor is 
so far from the other's that they do not share much common ground, if any. They will be 
in the difficult situation of talking about language, but disagreeing about it on such 
fundamental issues that any understanding of the other's position is virtually impossible. 
The conventions they will be working in do not have very much in common. Hence 
Socrates refuses to get into the old argument about whether it is possible to speak lies, 
say that which is not, by saying "KOJ.lllfOrspos J.Lev o A.Oyos ij rear' iJ.Li rcai rcara n]v 
eJ.l~V ~AtiClaV, cb sra'fps" ("your argument, friend, is tOO subtle for a man Of my age") 
( 429d7-8) This is very dismissive, especially since "KOJ.lllfOS" was used by Socrates at 
425dl-426b2 to mean "evasion". What Socrates seems to be saying here is that I am an 
old man and have not got time or inclination to go into that very clever, evasive and old 
argument here. The words may say that a man cannot say that which is not, but we all 
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know that a man can lie. This is the beginning of an answer: the point is precisely that 
man can say what is not because language is separated from truth. Language is not the 
same as, or a mirror image of, reality. Before Socrates could convince Cratylus that he is 
wrong in this argument, he must show him that a philosopher must love and trust truth 
and knowledge, not words. Cratylus, of course, may not believe this argument either, but 
is merely engaged in an argument. He does not press Socrates for an answer to the riddle. 
He then does not expand on his idea that a foreigner addressing him as Hermogenes 
would be doing any more than talking a meaningless non-sense (429e3-430a7), thus 
leaving the reasons for his position ambiguous. Socrates will have to press him to give a 
positive answer as to what it is that he does believe about language, rather than these 
mysterious and rather negative riddles. 
At 429a2-ll it is established that the art of naming is comparable to the art of painting. 
The assumption here is that names must be constructed in a similar way to paintings; they 
must in some sense represent whatever it is that they refer to. But unlike painting, one 
cannot, according to Cratylus, have a badly made name. It would not be a bad name, but 
would be no name at all: names are only names if they are correctly given: Cratylus says 
"brt 8i mrs ovo,uaazv ou, aM.' avay/Carov n ad opems" ("not in the case of names-
they must necessarily be always right") ( 430e 1-2). Whilst the analogy with painting is 
useful for Socrates in his present situation, it is also useful for Plato in the long run. His 
famous attack on painting in Republic X is inevitably brought to mind, and so his 
apparent philosophical problems with that art fonn. This comparison with words does not 
bode well for Plato's final assessment of language. 
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The argument then seems to take an unexpected turn when, at 43la6-7, Cratylus appears 
to agree with Socrates that names are like pictures in that someone can be shown a 
pictorial representation of themselves and see it as themselves even if it is not particularly 
good. But, while Cratylus is happy to accept that pictures can represent with varying 
degrees of quality, he is not prepared to allow the analogy to run that far in the case of 
words. At 43le9-432a4, Crat~lus makes the very good point that a word that has been 
written incorrectly is not so much an incorrectly written word, but is a different word 
from the intended original, such as whole or hole, or is nonsensical, such as who I. 
Socrates takes this point and turns it around to form a very important argument against 
the possibility that words can be perfectly representational of their subjects. 
At 432a8-d9, Socrates says that an image must necessarily be different from the original, 
or there would not be an original and an image, but rather two 'originals'. His example is 
that if there were an exact copy ofCratylus, then there would not be Cratylus and the 
copy-Cratylus, but two completely indistinguishable and interchangeable Cratyluses. This 
seems rather unfair. Socrates is comparing a metaphysical representation (the name) with 
a physical one (another Cratyl~s) and assuming that the results will be the same. A name 
is an intellectual representation of an idea; its only representational function is mental, 
and without the human mind to understand it, a word represents nothing. But this 
argument is not designed as proof to those who already agree that language is, to some 
extent, a human convention. It is aimed purely at Cratylus and people like him. In their 
case, with their predicates involving the painting analogy, a perfect representation of a 
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thing in language must mean that the thing is completely reproduced in a linguistic form. 
There could be no difference between the nominatum and the name. In effect, we would 
end up in a situation where there is no language. It would be impossible to tell the names 
and the named apart because the name could not stand for the named, but would actually 
have to be it in order for it to be a perfect representation. However, if language does not 
work in this completely and perfectly representational style, then it would be perfectly 
possible for Cratylus to stand next to his name, and for anyone to be able to tell them 
apart. This is clearly the way it works; no-one could mistake Cratylus the man for the 
written or spoken word 'Cratylus'. Cratylus the word does not have some natural 
representational connection to Cratylus the man, but the human mind, once taught how, 
interprets that collection of letters or sounds to stand for the idea of Cratylus. This 
reductio ad absurdum has made it apparent that they were not using opBor17s correctly in 
relation to naming. They must reconsider what they mean by it, hence "ii c;l}rct nva 
aM17V OVOJ.lafOS opB6r11ra, Kat J.Lq OJ.lOAOYcl 8ryN.uJ.La ovM.af3a'is Kat ypaJ.LJ.Lam 
npayJ.Laros OVOJ.La cTvat. ci yap raura CxJ.Ll/JOrcpa ipcrs, oux oios r' lan OVJ.Ll/Jmvciv 
aaurcp." ("you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer 
maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables")(433bl-3) The 
meaning of opBor17s that will emerge is double-edged. They will, in the following 
discussion, find a sort of correctness, or consistency, in the application of names in 
Heracleitean flux. This is not surprising: Socrates, in his games with Hermogenes, has 
just shown how language does indeed flow as it evolves over time. It is not constant, but 
letters and sounds change over the ages for whatever reason: laziness, a wish to sound 
grander, the influence of foreigners. As it is, Plato has shown that this idea of a perfect 
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language is not even a possibility, and can have Socrates say that language necessarily 
has faults (432dll-433a2). 
At 433d7-434e4, Socrates gets Cratylus to agree that rrpwra ("the first nouns" [Jowett] or 
"the primary names" [Fowler]) were representative of their subjects: "o.Mp Kat rravn 
imwxovn" ("representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation 
by any chance sign") ( 434a 1-2). However, he then attacks Cratylus by using CJKA:rypoTI]s 
to show that it means 'hard' to both of them, even though it contains a lamda, which was 
agreed to be a soft sound. Cratylus agrees, and concedes that this word carries its 
meaning because of custom, "8u:l YE ro 6fJos" (434e4). The idea that language may have 
been built up out of elements, so that certain letters represent certain sounds which 
indicate certain things ('p' for rapidity, for example), and then the combination of these 
representative sounds in a word give it its meaning, is not entirely dismissed. But even if 
there may have been an original language that directly represented its nominata, either 
through onomatopoeia or some other way, language now is different. Perhaps in an ideal 
world it would have a direct connection to things, but in the language that Plato was 
using, Cratylus admits that language works through custom. 
Socrates goes on to explain that Cratylus can only recognise Socrates', or indeed 
anybody's, meaning through his words which he recognises as part of a convention15. 
The process of communication is complex. There is the idea in Socrates' mind which he 
1 ~ That convention is the one into which we are born in society, so the convention has the history of that 
society. 
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represents or expresses ("oqltmJ.w") by the use of a word. That word has its connection to 
an idea only through convention. When Cratylus hears the word, he recognises it and 
knows what it refers to within that convention, and so he can understand, to whatever 
extent, Socrates. The word is used as an oral representation of the idea, but that 
representation only occurs because of convention: it is not an abstract oral painting, but a 
set of sounds that is known to stand for a particular idea rather than 'being like' it. The 
word is a reference point for an idea that must already exist in both communicating minds 
for any sort of communication to take place. The success of the communication depends 
on how close the conventions are of the two interlocutors. It is for this reason that one 
must define terms before a philosophical debate. It is necessary to set up a convention in 
a rather artificial way so that everyone means the same when they say the same. If 
language were in the ideal state that Cratylus wants it to be in, then there would 
presumably never be any problems over definitions. The fact that there have been, with 
opOoTI]s and J1ZJ11JC1lS, shows that convention is necessary for communication. 
This is not to say that Socrates likes the conclusion he is coming to: "iJloz JlEV oov Kaz 
avrq) apiaK.El JlEV Kara ro 8vvarov OJlOla dvat ra OVOJlara rots npayjlamv· aAAci 
Jli! ms aA1J0Ws, ro rou 'EpJ1oy£vovs, yAiaXPa i1 ;, o.M:-,J aVTI] ri]s OJlOlOTI]'t"OS, 
avayKazov oi i7Kaz rq) lPO{mKqJ romcp npoaXPijaOat, rfl avvOijKn, Els OVOJlara>v 
opOoTI]ra." ("I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; 
but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a kind of hunger, 
which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to 
correctness") (435c2-7). Socrates, in an ideal world, would prefer an ideal language that 
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worked through OJ10ta. But he must succumb to the products of his dialectic, and accept 
that language is not perfect. 
Having established this, the dialogue moves on to cast some doubt over how much we 
can rely on words in education. At 435d4-436a8, Cratylus says that knowing the name 
means knowing the thing. Socrates interprets that as meaning that the name is somehow 
connected to the thing in having the same nature, so that, according to Socrates' 
interpretation ofCratylus' theory, by examining the name, one should alight on the truth 
behind them, on the truth of the world. But of course there is a major problem with this 
idea, especially when the previous etymologies are taken into consideration. If the first 
name giver was mistaken in his belief about how the world was, then in examining his 
language in the search for answers, all that one could come up with would be falsehoods 
(436b5-ll). Words change, but the truths they try to stand for are eternal. 
Cratylus responds by saying that the original name giver must have had knowledge of the 
world for his names to mean anything, and that if he did not, then they would not be 
names at all. Cratylus is a Heracleitean16, and Socrates' 'discovery' ofHeracleitean 
principles in words is turned back against him. Cratylus' 'proof that the name giver had 
knowledge is that all names are consistent in their representation of the world as being in 
flux. Socrates sets out to show that this is not the case, despite what he said to 
Hermogenes. 
16 See 440d8-e2 
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He starts his response by saying ( 436c7 -d4) that if the name giver was mistaken, then that 
error would consistently penetrate the whole language, and then takes a side-swipe at all 
the mathematicians by comparing the error in language to that in a geometrical diagram 
which goes unnoticed before throwing everything into confusion. The calculations are 
consistent, but wrong. Then Socrates says "DEl 8~ 7rEpl riis apxijs navros npayparos 
' I ' I ~\ 'J; .-L) I ' ~ \ ~- \ ,/, I .-L) ' \ ' I V1rOKEL!al" EKElVTfS uE E,_,ErauoEl01]S LKaVWS, ra AUL1ra 'faLVEuoaL EKELV[1 E1rOJ.1EVa." 
("every one must therefore give great care and attention to the beginnings of any 
undertaking, to see whether his foundation is right or not. If that has been considered with 
proper care, everything will follow") ( 436d4-8). This reads almost like a justification for 
philosophy. It is entirely necessary for Socrates to ask "what is x", because if 'x' is 
properly defined then there is no problem in finding the right conclusion. It flows 
'naturally' from the correct foundations. It also highlights the problems occurring in this 
dialogue because Cratylus is approaching the subject from such a completely different 
basis from Socrates. Cratylus is impossible to persuade because he just reverts back to his 
slogan that only a naturally correct name is a name at all. He is unwilling, or perhaps 
unable, to examine this assumption. He may have been to all the best lectures, but he 
does not think and question himself and others. He "dpwvdJErat" in the way suggested 
by Hermogenes at 384a 1. Socrates has already shown that the language they are 
communicating with does have at least an element of convention in it, and yet Cratylus 
persists in his belief that language is only a language if it is perfectly representative of 
what it describes. He will not consider the very basis on which he bases all his thoughts 
on language. 
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At 436d8-437c8 Socrates says that there is no consistency in the elemental construction 
of names. He shows that 'good' words such as imanJJ11J can be made to stem from the 
stopping of motion rather than its continuation. This puts them in the same category as 
the 'bad' words. Some 'bad' words' etymologies contain motion, such as aJ.LaB{a 
(ignorance) and aKoA.aaia (unrestraint): aJ.LaBia, we are told, is from "apa Beep iovros 
nopda" ("the progress of one who goes with god") ( 43 7c l) and aKoA.aaia from 
"aKoA.ovBia rols npayJ.Lam" (movement in company with things") ( 437c2). However, 
the roots again seem suspiciously playful. Socrates even refers to his earlier explanation 
of imanJJ11J here. At 412a3-4 it is derived from in&rat and explains that which follows 
the motion of things correctly; herec Socrates keeps the iota, and has it deriving from 
rar7Jmv (437a4), meaning standing still. We believed him before, but now he tells us the 
'answer' is "aJ.Ll/Jt{JoA.ov" ("ambiguous") (437a3). This is an odd game for someone to 
play who is concerned with the truth. Perhaps the truth is that Socrates is playing a game. 
There are three levels to this game. One is that if the participants in the dialogue (which 
include the reader) just listen (or read), and do not question what is being said, then it is 
all too easy to deceive with words precisely because they are not truth, but are a tool for 
talking about it which can easily be misused or abused. Another is that even if one does 
start questioning these derivations, there is still a problem because each seems equally 
believable and unbelievable. How could anyone claim one to be right and another wrong? 
They both 'explain' the meaning, and yet neither can be confidently trusted because both 
are given and both seem equally plausible -or implausible, depending on how one 
approaches them. Knowing the derivation is irrelevant when compared to knowing a 
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word's meaning: what counts is the truth which the word is an indicator of: that is the 
relationship which we have to explore. The third idea at play here is that of Socrates' 
d;rvry. There remains only one truth as to the derivation of bnan7J1T'J, but Socrates has 
the verbal skill to provide two. Both derivations, however, carry a similar meaning, that 
of the soul being around, and in an affinity with, truth. The nominatum remains the same, 
even ifthe word play of the derivations changes. 
Cratylus now agrees with Socrates that the number of words which can be shown to 
contain an Heracleitean etymology does not prove anything because some can be made to 
contain opposite ideas depending on the argument, and anyway, democracy has nothing 
to do with correctness (437dl-7). Cratylus' word-counting argument does not seem to be 
one he believes in because he gives it up so fast, but rather it is an attempt at an ad 
hominem argument to catch out Socrates, and thus allow Cratylus to be the victor. His 
belief that language is only language when it is correct remains. His loss in this smaller 
argument about the Greek they are using does not affect his argument concerning 
language-as-it-should-be. He can still claim that true and ideal names were given by some 
god and that no other sort of name is a real name but something else (438b8-c6), and that 
therefore if one knows the true, ideal name then one knows the thing it refers to. He does 
not seem to view the language of their conversation as meaningful at all. 
At 438b4-7, Socrates points out the circularity in Cratylus' argument that a 
name must necessarily be right to be a name at all, and that if one therefore 
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knows the name, one knows the thing named: "r[va o&v rponov 4JwJ1£V avrovs 
£i8oras fJSa()m ij vo}lofJiras dvat, npiv Kat onovv ovoJla K£ia(}az r£ Kat iKdvovs 
£i8ivat, cl7r£p jlry san ra npayjlaTa J1a0£tV aM' ij EK rwv OVOJlarwv" ("but if things 
are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had . 
knowledge, or were legislators, before there were names at all, and therefore before they 
could have known them?") ( 438b4-7). He is accusing Cratylus of confusing the 
relationship between what there is to be known, knowledge itself and how we attempt to 
express, and come by more, knowledge through language. Truth came first, then a 
knowledge of truth, and then finally words as an attempt to express that knowledge. After 
all "sanv apa ... 8vvarov J1a0£tV aV£V OVOJlarwv ra ovra," ("it is possible to learn 
things without names")(438e2-3). One can, for example, understand the concept ofthe 
number five- there being the same number of things as fingers on one's hand- without 
knowing the word 'five'. In order to attempt to communicate that concept, however, one 
needs to have a sound that stands for it. 
This model of language's relationship to truth is also explained by: "Kat rwv JlSV 
4>aCJKOVTWV iavra dvat ra OJlOLa rfj aATJOd<!, rwv 8' iavra'"'some [words] 
asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that they are" (438d3). It must be 
significant that no name claims to be the truth, but the right ones are 'like the truth'. 
Cratylus does not object to this. If Cratylus meant the language of their conversation to be 
perfect, then their words would actually be truth in some way, because their connection to 
what they describe would be so close and rigid. If there is only one true name for any 
particular thing, then that name has to be somehow a shape and a sound that is 
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completely equivalent to the truth it stands for. The word would completely encapsulate 
the idea it would there to communicate. But for Socrates, and presumably Plato, the 
closest a word that humans use can get to truth is to be like it. It represents truth, or has 
an affinity to it. Our knowledge of truth seems to work on a similar level: "dpa 8z' 
a.Mov rov ij OOtrep elKOS re Kat8ucazorarov, 8z' a.A.Al]M-ov ye, et trn avyyevij lanv, 
Kat aura 8z' aurmv,·" ("What other way can there be of knowing them [ ra KaM] except 
the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and 
through themselves?")(438e6-8) Literally, avyyevry means 'born with', 'congenital', or 
'relative to'. It expresses the idea of something being 'akin' to something else, being of a 
like kind. Plato is aware of the limitations of language, but also conscious that it is the 
only tool we have to discuss and progress towards truth. But truth is different and 
separate from language, and so all we can do with language is talk about what truth is 
like, not truth itself. Therefore we can have long, apparently rambling and wandering 
conversations with no conclusion, and we can have myths and allegories. All language 
use, all discussion, becomes a kind of story because it cannot get straight at the truth and 
express it directly, but must describe it second hand, or at a second remove from the 
subject of the speech. All are as much a part of philosophy as the 'rational' question and 
answer dialogue. Our tool for discussing truth has, after all, in a way only an allegorical 
connection to truth, in that it is like it. Whilst truth is independent and true by its nature, 
in our search for it, comparisons are helpful, perhaps even necessary, hence "8z' 
illl]M-ov" 17. However, the possibility of a direct knowledge of truth remains in "aura 
8z' aurmv", but this is outside language. Truth can only be 'translated' into language, so 
17 See below on the Statesman for the importance ofparadeigms and comparisons. 
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that that interpretation is necessarily not truth, because, as we have already established, 
there could not be two truths. If language were truth, we would be in difficulty because 
there would not be a truth and its representation in language, but there would be two 
indistinguishable truths. 
The ambiguities of written language are then exploited by Plato in an extended 
philosophical joke. Socrates has just said that language cannot be truth, and Cratylus 
agrees with him by saying "aA.:ryOij J.lOL 4Jaivn Aiyt:tv" ("what you are saying is, I think, 
true") (438el0). That is exactly what has just been established that one cannot do, and yet 
everyone knows what Cratylus means. Socrates has not spoken 'The Truth', but has used 
language to communicate a truth. It is unclear whether Cratylus is supposed to be aware 
of the irony in what he has said. If he is not, then he is not practising what he is preaching 
about language~ the position he has taken is just a stand for the purposes of the argument 
and he is not serious about philosophy. If he is aware of the irony, then he is confirming 
his position that the language they are using is not perfect, because he can say this but not 
literally or entirely mean what he says. Socrates certainly is aware of the irony, because 
his response, "sxs oT, npos L\zos" ("stop for heaven's sake") (439al), seems to mean 
stop playing, presumably because Socrates feels they are finally getting somewhere, and 
he is an old man and cannot play games forever. The extra level that this is a made up 
dialogue, reported as if true, means that the author, Plato, can make his characters do and 
say whatever he wants them to. Plato's words are not an exact replica of a conversation 
that actually took place, but are about what sort of dialogue might occur between these 
men. We have to trust Plato that his dialogues contain an element of truth, however vague 
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or specific. We, as readers, know that the words we are dealing with are in one sense 
untrue because they were never said in the way that Plato presents them, but we trust that 
they are also concerning some truth, and contain some too. The truth of what he gets his 
characters to say is not literally true in the sense that it happened, but true in the sense 
that it contains general truths. When we are reading an invented dialogue, we must be 
aware of the difficult relationship between words and truth, but must also realise that 
there is another 'gap' between what the characters say and what the author means. Of 
course, we can only really ever guess, in a sense, at any extra-linguistic truth or meaning 
by using the language because that is all the 'reported' dialogue is. We can look at it in 
the light of other dialogues, but still the basis for any judgement we can make on what 
Plato meant in what he wrote is the text. If Plato gave oral lessons, there may be things 
we can never know. All we have is what Plato wrote; we will never know what Plato 
said. He is not available to be questioned, he can never explain any further what he 
meant. The reader has to take on the role of questioner and answerer. He has to get 
involved in any debate on Plato's words from both sides: he has to ask what Plato means 
and he has to try to find out the answers, either from the dialogues or from intelligent 
guess work. He has to approach the subject from all sides: he has to try to understand it, 
by himself, as a whole, with the characters who's words he reads to help him. We cannot 
just read the dialogue as if it were a true to life record, we have to remember it was 
written by one man with the advancement of philosophy in mind. 
With all these problems surrounding it, we are in need of a defence of language. This 
Socrates gives at 439a6-b9 "lX2K: si oov &an piv on paAI.ara 8t' OVOJlclTOJV ra 
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npayjlara JlaVfJaVclV, gart 8i Kat bt' atm:ov, noripa av cl1J KaJJ.irov Kat 
avrijs ci npcnovrws ctpyaarat,• KPAT: £K rijs CxA7]fJcias JlOL bOKcl avayK1] dvat. 
LQK: ovrtva JliV ro{vvv rponov bel JlavfJav£LV ij cVplaKclV ra ovra, JlclSOV taws 
' ' ' ' ,, ' ' ' \ , ' ' ~ ' ' -. f , ..-Ll 1!1 ' £onv £YVWK£Vat 7J Kar £}1£ Kat a£· ayan7Jrov u£ Kat rovro OJlOAoy7Jaauoat, on ovK 
rwv ovoparwv. KPAT: </Ja{vcrat, (h LmKparcs." ("Soc: Let us suppose that to any 
extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names, and suppose also 
that you can learn them from the things themselves- which is likely to be the nobler and 
clearer way; to learn of the image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is 
the expression have been rightly conceived or to learn of the truth whether the truth and 
the image of it have been duly executed? 
Crat: I should say that to learn of the truth must be the best way. 
Soc: How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. 
We must rest content with the admission that knowledge of things is not to be derived 
from names. No; they must rather be studied and investigated in their connexion with one 
another.") To study the truth would be best, but that is beyond even Socrates. Instead we 
are forced into using language, and Socrates can use his rixv7J therein to describe what 
truth is like, rather than try to discover it directly, which cannot be done through studying 
language or words or names but rather what lies behind them. Cratylus' idea of a perfect 
language is not available to us. Our words can never be replica Forms. Socrates has 
shown that the basis of our language is wrongly conceived, and this means that his search 
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for truth using this ill-prepared tool is all the harder. But, as has also been shown in this 
dialogue, there is no one better equipped in the ways of language. 
Socrates says at 439bl0-c6 that he can easily believe that the names were given with this 
idea of motion and flux ("iovrwv Cl7Z"QVTWV at:l KQl pt:ovrwv" ("all things are always in 
motion and flux") ( 439c2-3))in mind, in the mistaken Heracleitean belief that the world 
worked in that way. This really throws open the debate on the tone of the etymological 
section. There is so much playfulness in it that it could never be described as completely 
serious philosophy, and yet here Socrates seems to be admitting that he may have been 
right in that section as regards the basis of his etymologies. This indicates more of the 
difficulties of language: Socrates tells something like the truth in his etymologies in that 
they can be made to 'reveal' Heracleitean flux, but this does not mean that truth itself, 
being as being, is in constant flow. Socrates' words, and language in general, have the 
potential to be deceptive. But Plato is never completely serious. He wrote dialogues about 
relaxed, social situations. The Cratylus is slightly odd in that Socrates does not start the 
discussion, but is dragged into it. He becomes involved during somebody else's argument 
and plays the devi]'s advocate. Plato's Socrates could only treat this position with 
humour. Most human verbal interaction is littered with irony, jokes and non-serjousness; 
having Socrates, with all his verbal talent, as the discussion leader could only increase the 
playfulness. Even at this point, a crucial step in the completion of the dialogue, Socrates 
makes a joke with "a..U' OOTOL avmf Tt: wcmt:p t:ls nva 8ivryv iwceaoVTt:S KVKWVTat 
Kal ryjlas eif>t:AKOjlt:VOl npoat:jl{Ja..UOvmv" ("and having fallen into a kind of whirlpool 
themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them") ( 439c4-6). This is 
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the idea that if someone sees everything as being in motion, then they themselves get 
caught up in that constant whirl, and get dizzy: they are in the dizziness of error, because 
as far as Socrates is concerned there are constants which are not in a state of flux (c4), 
and that dizziness begets a second dizziness, because if the world were constantly 
flowing around them, then it would make them dizzy. The concept ofmotion itself gets 
up speed and whirls everyone around in a blur, rather than the clarity that constants, like 
beauty itself in the abstract, could give us if we could only 'see' them 18. A point is made, 
but it is done in an apparently light-hearted fashion. Socrates may have found a 
consistency in his etymologising, as far as their connections to flowing are concerned, but 
the satire was on the basis for that whole method of inquiry: if Socrates was right in his 
explanation of the etymologies, then that whole exercise is useless because it will reveal 
nothing about truth since words have been wrongly given. It may appear that the world is 
in flow (439d3-4) because the examples of the constants that we see around us do change 
as time continues, but for Socrates there are things which never change. This means that 
Socrates could poke fun at the sty le of some etymologisers, and at etymology itself as a 
route to truth: iflanguage has been developed based on a misguided philosophy, then no 
truth will emerge from its study. All that will happen if trust is put in words as holders of 
truth is that the original mistake will be perpetuated, and everyone will be dizzy. It is not 
words themselves that will reveal truth to us, but we must use them in well understood 
conventions to talk about truth, whilst being aware of our tool's limitations and problems. 
Words are the creations of men, and not perfect. They can be picked apart to reveal a 
18It is also interesting that they are falling into this idea of motion, because, of course, they should be 
ascending into divine eternity and knowledge. 
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consistent philosophy in the same way that they can be twisted in a sophistic manner to 
'prove' almost anything. 
The dialogue concludes with the explicit introduction of constant abstracts. At 439c6-dl 
Socrates brings them into the conversation: "rndl/faz yap, (b eavJ.lams Kpawk, 3 
6v EKaarov rwv ovrwv OUrW, i] J.lrJ;" ("There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which 
I often dream and should Jike to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not 
some permanent nature of goodness, beauty, and several other things?") This is in direct 
contradiction to the Heracleitean flux. The argument is finally set up between the view 
that everything is always changing, and the idea of some stable things such as ro 
KaAOv and ro aya()ov. Socrates very quickly brings the subject to its core, which rests 
on the nature and possibility of knowledge. Socrates sets out what seems to be a 'double' 
view of everything: what is around him, "OOK6l ravra navra psiv" (all such things 
appear to be in flux) (439d4), but there is a stable level of reality, "ro KaA.Ov ov 
rowvrov as[ iarzv otov iarzv;" (does not true beauty always retain its essential 
quality?) ( 439d5-6), to which Cratylus, the Heracleitean, agrees20. Absolute beauty 
cannot change, because as soon as it does, then it is no longer absolute beauty. It is 
independent of any examples. In examples ofbeauty, there is always a change (439d8-
19 Why does Socrates 'dream' these things? Is the waking world incapable of discovering these things in 
their pure fomt? Perhaps the conventions of' real' life hold us back in our search for truth. If we pull out of 
that world and instead immerse ourselves in pure thought (i.e. dreams) we may gain an extra method of 
creating an affinity between us and Truth. Perhaps Socrates only knows these things in the same sense as 
one knows what one has dreamt: the dreaming experience is very different from trying to recollect it when 
awake. Dreams are slippery things that escape our grasp as we try to remember what they were. We know 
that there is a memory of something, but we cannot pin that thing down exactly. 
20 See below for an explanation of why he might do this. 
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12), but because we are still able to call it beautiful, and therefore identify it as partaking 
in beauty, then there must be a stable 'beauty'. That cannot change, because if it ever did, 
then it would no longer be beauty ( 439e 1-6). And furthermore, any change in these stable 
entities would rule out the possibility of knowledge. If it is always in a process of change, 
then it is never the same, which means it is unknowable because it is different, and so 
unrecognisable, each time it is approached. A world of fluctuating general principles 
would be indescribable and unknowable because there would be no certainties on which 
we could rely and with which' we could separate out the world we found around us into 
understandable categories ( 4J9e7-440a5)21 . But not only would we not have things to 
I 
I 
know: neither would we have the ability to do any knowing. If knowing itself ("auro ro 
doos ... rijs yvwasws" (the very nature of knowing) ( 440a9-b I)) changes, then it can 
never be the same and so ceases to exist as 'knowing'. In a world of complete flux "ours 
TO yvroaOJlSVOV ours TO yvroa()1JaOJ1SVOV av sl1J" (there will be no one to know and 
nothing to be known) (440b4). The 'deus ex machina' that makes knowledge and a 
knowable world possible is the idea of things that exist "ast" (always) (440b5). Each 
thing partakes in an abstract eternal stability, a Form, which allows us to recognise and 
know it22 . But the concept of an eternal and stable knowledge is difficult. It is in 
knowledge's nature to change, to grow as the knowledge increases. Our everyday 
knowledge is a process of putting together what we previously knew, applying it to 
whatever we come across, and then 'creating' more knowledge through argument, 
21 This quote is as relevant to modem particle physics as it is in this dialogue about words. 
22 The reference to "ovrws oleaOa, Kal ra npaypara 8taKelaOm" ("believing that physical things 
flow"[my translation]) (440dl-2) is in conjuction with the image of the world being like a person with a 
runny nose, consfantly dribbling. It is punning on the idea that a Heracteitean diagnoses the world as 
suffering such an affliction. But it aJso strikes me as similar to Sartre's idea of the world as a 'viscous' 
mass which is made solid and understandable by our imposition of categories and jobs for the things we see 
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deduction or perhaps inspiration. This certainly seems to resemble Heracleitus' view of 
constant change because we always change our knowledge merely by interacting with the 
world around us. But this is not the sort of knowledge that Plato is here talking about. For 
Plato, there is a permanent and stable form of knowledge, that of Knowledge of s¥8ry. 
Because they are stable in their nature, any knowledge we have of them also must be 
stable. Our route to that knowledge of eternal things is a process of discovery and so 
change. Bl!t we do not have a knowledge of them yet. We may read and partake in 
arguments concerning them, we may hear stories about what they are like, but we can 
only know them when we know them independently of examples from the tangible 
world, which I think involves knowing them outside language, which has proved to be so 
problematic. 
Cratylus, who signs up to the Heracleitean view that everything flows ( 440d9-e2), also 
agrees with Socrates that there are stable entities ( 439d2). Either Cratylus is being held 
up as a man who really is not thinking about what is being said to any degree but is only 
listening, or the absolute opposite. The only solution I can see that gives Cratylus a 
defence against the accusation of arrogance is that he has been listening very carefully 
and has reached a conclusion along the lines of this: if language is such an untrustworthy 
thing, then how can any conclusion discovered in an argument which necessarily uses 
language to propel itself be trusted? We have seen how language can be manipulated 
earlier in the dialogue where Socrates uses language to show that the components of that 
language can be made to 'mean' opposite things depending on which argument one 
around us. For Plato, the Forms mean that we are not faced with this mess that the Heracliteans and Sartre 
would otherwise have us immersed in. 
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wishes to use at the time (imcrn]JlrJ at 412a3-4 and then at 437a3-5), so the only 
conclusion that they have reached here is that, according to the current argument, 
Socrates is right. Perhaps if they approached the same subject in a different way on 
another day, then different conclusions would be reached. In this battle of words, 
Cratylus has lost. Inside the argument, he must accept its conclusions; but the words 
cannot force him to change his beliefs because ideas exist outside language, and so are 
not susceptible to its tricks or ambiguities23 . 
But language remains our only option for communication, and while a healthy suspicion 
and wariness about it and anything it claims to prove is necessary, so is its use as an 
expression and communication of thoughts. Be1iefs need to be questioned: Janguage is 
the only way one person can force another to consider what they think they know. 
Cratylus must 1isten to Socrates' argument; he must consider the world presented to him 
in it and compare it with his own. But he does not believe that the argument proves 
anything about the world, only about the argument. Socrates' uncertainty at the end of the 
dialogue perhaps reflects a similar attitude when he says of the whole debate between 
stability and Heracleitus that "f..l'fJ ov /Jc!-8wv n bnmdl/faa()at" ("it is a question hard to 
determine") (440c3). He says ofHeracleitean flux "iams JlEV o~v 8r], dJ Kpaw/..£, 
OV'fOJS EX£L, 'iams 8£ Kat ou" ("this may be true, Cratylus, but it is also very likely to be 
untrue") (440d3-4). On this major debate Socrates can say that there is always an 
uncertainty. But the question remains, and we must do our best as humans to answer it: 
there is always a debate to be had. 
23 This may also offer an explanation as to why Plato chose Cratylus to appear in this dialogue. He is 
reputed, after having taught Plato, to have eventually given up on language and only to have communicated 
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The conversation ends with Cratylus declaring his Heracleitean beliefs, but the two agree 
to meet again. Socrates appeals to Cratylus' arrogance by saying "(JK&Ijlapsvov 8&, &av 
d5pns. psra8L8ovm Kai &po{" ("examine, and if you find anything, share it with 
me"[my translation]) (440d6-7). But Cratylus thinks he has already examined the issue, 
despite his youth ( 440d5), and knows the answer. This is despite, or because of, all that 
Socrates has just said. The bravado of Craty1us' last words leave him looking almost 
hubristic. He is talking to Socrates, a philosopher of some repute, and he ]eaves him with 
"a.M.d Kal aV 'lf&lpW &n SVVOl&lV ravra ij8r( ("I hope, however, that you wi]] continue 
to think about these things yourself') ( 440e6-7). Socrates, as is clear from the speech he 
has just given and the reputation of the character that Plato portrays, has thought about 
these things. Cratylus looks like rather an upstart. But, as we have seen, he may have a 
point: since language as we have it is not perfect, and an argument is constructed out of 
and represented by language, the argument may not be as powerful as would first appear. 
But this argument wi11 always be open to the charge that its conc1usion disproves itself, 
because it has been reached by verbal argument. If this is Craty1us' thinking, he will keep 
on going around in circ1es: he can believe no argument is significant about the world 
around him, not even the one that removes any argument's significance. Throughout the 
whole dialogue, Cratylus has been verba11y agreeing with Socrates' arguments, but at the 
end he is ]eft with the same be1iefs with which he started: no language is a real language 
unless it is perfect. Only an argument constructed from the perfect language has 
significance on the world, but Socrates' two Craty1us' argument seems to disprove the 
possibility of a perfect representative language. Therefore the best that we can do is use 
by moving one of his fingers. 
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the language we have in argument which are about the world. Here, even Socrates seems 
to be saying that conclusions reached in arguments do not prove the world to be this way 
or that way. Humans will never be able to discuss the world completely, only partially. 
Discussion will always be at one remove from what is being discussed. Language stands 
for something else; language is, in some sense, metaphorical. The conclusions of 
arguments that use language are not necessarily how the world is, but the results of our 
linguistic representations ofthe world can show us what the world might be like. No 
argument, it seems, is final. 
Socrates' use of"8u5a;sls" ("you shall give me a lesson") at 440e3 shows that he 
believes that Cratylus may still, despite what has gone on before, be1ieve in lectures. He 
' is tempting Cratylus to disprove his own belief in the lack of power in words by returning 
to teach what it is he does believe. Of course, any such lesson conducted in speech would 
instantly discredit its giver, because any speech given in an attempt to demonstrate why 
speech has no power would be a contradiction24. This may explain why Cratylus had to 
be so aloof and ironical when talking to Hermogenes before the dialogue started (383b7-
384a4). The nature of his the9ry prevents its own explanation. Cratylus' reply to this 
appeal to his arrogance is left ambiguous by Plato: "raur' &arm" (translated by Jowett as 
"very good", literally meaning "these things will be") ( 440e6). Is he agreeing to come 
back and give Socrates the benefit of his youthful wisdom in a talk (answering "sis 
aOOls ro{vvv J.1E ... 8l&1;sls" ("then, another day ... when you come back, you shaH give 
me a lesson") (440e3-4)), or is he merely agreeing to leave the conversation for now and 
24 [t would be, perhaps, a dictum contra dicta 
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go into the country with Hermogenes as Socrates suggests (answering "vuv 8£, axmcp 
rrap£(]1(£Uaaat, 1r0p£VOV ds aypov· rrporrif.1'1'£l 8£ 0£ Kat 'Epf.lorivl]s OD£" ("but at 
present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your 
way") ( 440e4-5)). The language by itself does let the reader know. If one wants Cratylus 
to suffer from a rather stupid arrogance which does not allow him to consider an 
argument, only listen, then he will return to 'teach' Socrates; if one wants him to have a 
thoroughly considered doctrine which is as unbreakable by speech as it is inexplicable, 
then he is merely agreeing that the discussion is necessarily over. Plato, it seems, is 
demonstrating that language at least has the potential to be completely imprecise. 
Indeed, all Socrates can say for sure is "ov8£ m:lvv VOrJV ixovms av()pwrrov 
imrpiljfavra OVOJ.lamv avrov Kat n]v avmu lfiVxr1v {}£pa7r£V£lV" ("no man of sense 
will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names") ( 440c3-5). 
The Heracleitean influence on his language may really be there, but this is no reason to 
trust language. Socrates has shown that a Heracleitean world would be "ov8£v vyzis 
ov8£vos" ("an unhealthy state of unreality") ( 440c7-8) in which knowledge is 
impossible. But Plato has his more optimistic map of the world, where knowledge is what 
is to be sought after. There is every likelihood that those who were responsible for the 
early names, if there were such people, just got it wrong. Language has no privileged 
information on the nature of the world: it is a human construct. Any language which 
completely reflected the world it described would not be able to exist, because there 
would be a constant state of confusion as to what was language and what was being 
described. The language that there is has so much potential to be toyed with, moulded 
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and generally twisted, either by sophists or the etymologisers whom Socrates satirises, 
that it must be viewed with caution. It is our tool of communication, and more 
importantly our tool of philosophy. But it is not the goal. Knowledge outside language is 
what is searched for in our philosophical use of language. There is the problem that our 
tool is unreliable, but this dialogue has made us very aware of the difficulties in language 
and its use - both the speaking and the understanding of it. As long as we are aware that 
language by itself cannot be trusted, only those concepts behind it which we try to 
express through it, then we may be able to progress to knowledge. But as long as people 
trust in language, its roots and intricacies, and believe it to have an almost divine status as 
a direct passage to knowledge, then their errors need to be pointed out, and what better 
way to do that than through satire. The very nature of truth is that it is indescribable, but 
we must use our tool of language to approach it and talk about it, conscious that all we 
can do is talk about it, what it is like. Language on a very basic level necessarily gives us 
this one-stage-removal from truth, because we cannot utter truth, but a version of it in 
language, which therefore cannot actually be it. Then, with that language, we can circle 
the focal point of truth by using different words in various genres about truth, such as a 
dialogue, an allegory or a myth. If we build up enough true opinions about what truth is 
like, then we may one day ascend into knowledge of truth itself. We cannot do that 
through merely listening to words, but must engage ourselves in thoughtful conversation. 
A refusal to do so, for whatever reasons, will not help us towards a better understanding 
of the world. But in our conversations, we must be ever wary of our rather unreliable 
tool. 
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The Phaedrus 
In the Phaedrus, Plato manipulates his characters so that they provide a meditation on the 
means of the communication of truth or opinion. Plato is writing about writing. His 
starting point is not the individual words as it is in the Cratylus, but their use in 
combination to form language as a whole, and especially rhetorical language. The 
majority of the dialogue is occupied with the giving of examples of different sorts of 
speech, but from 257b7, the attention turns to a discussion on the giving of speeches. This 
section begins with a working through of rhetoric, what it is and how it works, and ends 
with a discussion on ypaJ1Jla1Ia (273d2ff), focusing on language's role in philosophy and 
showing its problems. 
This is necessarily difficult: there is only one tool available to us with which to discuss 
language and how it works, and that tool itself is language at work. It should be 
remembered that for Plato, there is the added complication that the words we read written 
on the page are both his and not his; they are created by him for his own philosophical 
purposes, and yet they are put into the mouths of characters other than Plato himself We 
are reading a play, a conversation staged for us. In order to be able to get anything from 
the dialogue, as with all Plato, but to differing degrees, we have to enter the game of both 
believing what we are reading, and not. We do not literally believe all the words and their 
presentation, we do not imagine that we are reading a forensic report of an actual 
conversation between Phaedrus and Socrates that took place outside the city of Athens in 
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the late fifth century B.C. 25 We read in the knowledge that in a very strict sense, we are 
reading a lie propounded by Plato, yet we understand that within the story there may be 
something that is relevant to our lives. We accept the convention and apply the sayings of 
a conversation from someone else's imagination to our version of reality. Already in 
language there are faintly bizarre things going on: we are told many things, yet we choose 
to read literally those things concerning our concept of philosophy and to keep those 
things said about the authenticity of the conversation as purely playful; they just help us 
'picture the scene'. Already we have judged the worth ofwhat Plato said; some is to be 
mostly ignored, some is to be written about at length. Language, the conveyor of Plato's 
meaning, and the reader's reaction to it, are both strange and obtuse things. 
The discussion pivots around 258d4-5: "ciM' EKElVO OLJlaL alawov ifoTJ, ro Jlft KaAills 
UyetV rE Kat ypal/JEtV aM' alawms TE Kat KaKms" ("but what is shameful, I think, is 
speaking and writing not in an acceptable way, but shamefully and badly"). Language, 
the record of civilisation, is linked by the philosopher with the potential shame and harm 
that it can bring before it is looked at in the light of its merits. If it is not used properly, it 
becomes the living space of untruths, and it can only be used properly once the 
philosopher knows its dangers and deceptions. It is against this background that Plato sets 
up the opposing forces: there are the philosophers who wish to use language as a means 
to search for truth and understanding26, and there are the orators who view language as 
25 There is evidence to suggest that Phaedrus was in fact in exile at the only time when Lysias (227b2-5) 
and Polemarchus (257b3-4) were in Athens together. See Rowe, Plato: Phaedrus, Warminster, 1986, pg 13-
14. 
26 And, perhaps, those like Cratylus, who have given up on language as a useful philosophical tool precisely 
because the orators, through their linguistic trickery, have demonstrated that the use oflanguage has 
nothing to do with the independent truth it claims to portray. 
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the means of persuasion. We start to understand what acceptable writing is a little better 
when, at 259e4-6, Socrates says that for things to be said "s{J ys Kat Ka.Aws", they must 
be said by someone who knows the truth about what he is speaking about. Phaedrus' 
reply is revealing, and made to be more so by Socrates afterwards: "ourroai nspt rourov 
" s:, () , ' 1 1 ~ \ s: , )! " '1 '() " s: , ' \ \ ovn utKata J.lav avstv a/1./l,U ra uoc.:,avr' av !rAT/ st Ol!rcp utKaaovmv, ov8s ra 
, , ()'" 1~ 1 11 " s:')! ' \ , " \ '() 1 11 ' ' ovrcos aya a T/ Ka/\.U a./l,.ll,' oaa uoc.:,st· cK yap rovrcvv stvat ro ;rst stv a./l,.ll,' ovK SIC 
rijs aA.T/()cfas" ("What I have heard about this, my dear Socrates, is that there is no 
necessity for the man who intends to be an orator to understand what is really just, but 
only what would appear so to the majority ofthose who will give judgement, and not 
what is really good or fine but whatever will appear so; because persuasion comes from 
that and not from the truth.") (259e7-260a4). The professional speaker has no interest in 
any truth other than being persuasive to a majority. The worth of the words, according to 
this view which Phaedrus inherits from others, is only measured by their persuasive 
success, not on whether they carry any truth: a persuasive lie is more useful to the orator 
than a truth which may be difficult to explain. Socrates refers to this as words of wise 
people, which should therefore not be cast aside (260a5-7). This is both ironic and literal. 
The problem has arisen because they are talking at cross-purposes, as so often happens in 
Plato's dialogues. Socrates means by "s{J rs KatKaA.Ws" something like 'well and 
acceptably in relation to the good' or 'well and acceptably in relation to the truth', 
whereas Phaedrus here interprets it to mean something along the lines of 'well and 
acceptably for what the speaker perceives to be his own good'. Socrates the philosopher 
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is concerned with the pursuit oftruth; Phaedrus the pupil (per~aps lover?) of rhetoric with 
the job of oratory- persuasion. Socrates' reply takes this into account. One expects him 
to take offence at what has just been said, yet he says that it must be listened to. I think 
that it is fair to read an irony in here, because we know that Socrates does not believe that 
one can speak well without knowledge ("dp' oov ovx l.mapxetv &I rois eO ye Kat 
KaAWS p7]81JGOJ1£VOLS nJV rov A£yovros OtavOLav etOVtav ro aA7]8£s dJv av £pet V 
nipl J1£JJ..n;" ("well then, for things that are going to be said well and acceptably, at least, 
mustn't there be a knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth about whatever he 
intends to speak about?") (259e4-6)). Yet he also literally means what he says: the ao</Joz 
are right to think that it is not necessary for a man of Athens at that time who wishes to be 
seen as an orator to have any interest in the truth. The Socratic or Platonic orator must 
understand what he is talking about, but a man is called an orator by the majority even if 
he has no knowledge of his subject. Not only does Socrates play a clever trick with 
language here, messing around with its tone so that it has two different but connected 
meanings stemming from the same words, but he also necessarily makes a reflexive point 
about language itself It is complicated; it is his tool but it can be abused, and it is seen as 
a tool for the abuse of truth by the majority- the same majority who need somehow to be 
persuaded otherwise. 
At 261a3-262c3 Socrates explains how it is that the philosopher is the only one who can 
speak "eO ye KazKakOs". First of a11, an image is settled upon for what it is that rhetoric 
does: "dp' oOv ov ro JliV OAoV ry P1JLOptKry av El1J r£xv1J 'lfVxaywy{a ns OLCl Adywv" 
("well then, will not the science of rhetoric as a whole be a kind of leading of the soul by 
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means of things said") (26la7-8). The way that the A.oyos is dressed up is what does the 
leading, rather than any pure truth at its centre27. The orator is concerned with nothing 
more than persuasion and he will "noujat:z </Javryvaz ro aura roi's aural's ror£ J1EV 
oztcazov, orav o£ {Jov.A:IJraz, aoztcov" ("make the same thing appear to the same people 
at one time just, but at any other time he wishes, unjust") (261 e 10-d 1 ). This does not just 
refer to the law courts, but to "navra ra A£yoj1£va" ("all things said") (26 1 e i ): the man 
with this skill is a magician. This is the image we find in Euthydemus 289d8-290a5, 
where Socrates says that speech makers have the ability to charm and enchant an 
audience so that even he himself is sometimes taken in. The idea that the orator can make 
a thing appear to be different from what it actually is (probably believing to a certain 
extent that things are as you make them to be) is very similar to the role of the painter in 
Republic X. The central and true core of whatever is being spoken about is changed 
because it is presented in language. For Plato, an act, for example, would either be just or 
unjust; for an orator of the day, its morality would entirely depend on the way it is 
presented to the court. Any presentation of the act in language would necessarily mean 
that the court are hearing a different version of the act to the one that actually happened 
because their version is a copy of an original. The orator exploits this gap between copy 
and original to make the copy in language appear however he wishes it to appear. 
27 There is also, perhaps, some word play on aywv in lf!VX-arw-yta, especially with the -wv taken from 
the end of loywv still ringing in the ear. This connects us into the game of rhetoric: the adversarial nature 
meant that aywv developed its meaning from any 'contest' to the verbal ones that took place within the law 
courts and assembly. The implication seems to be that anyone who is to be led will have to be conquered 
first. It just now depends on what it is that conquers them. Plato here is playing this game too, because he 
can only talk about language through using language. In this way, an explanation becomes an example of 
itself. 
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The rhetorician tries to lead his audience to whatever he wants them to believe, but 
cannot unless he understands completely what he is talking about. Socrates claims 
(261e6-262c3) that the easiest way to deceive someone is to lead them gradually, step by 
step, so that one slowly moves from similarities of the truth into dissimilarities and 
deception. But in order to be able to do so, the deceiver must know the truth from which 
he is leading his victim, or how can he possibly know which way to lead. This means that 
he who is involved in "hunting down appearances" ("oo~as os rd)1Jp&vKms") (262c2) 
has no chance of deception, which is the commonly perceived job of the orator. So it 
seems that in order to make the same thing appear both just and unjust, depending on 
which is preferable, one must understand justice. This, of course, can only be done by the 
philosopher, so he appears to be the only one capable oftpVzaywy{a ns 8u1 A6ywv. 
But surely the reader has to inteiject at this point. The philosopher understands justice, 
and so is necessarily bound by it28. He would therefore be incapable of doing anything 
against it, and one would expect that Platonic justice would not include malicious 
deception. A soul which is truly led by A6yot will be led by someone who completely 
understands what they are talking about. Those whose acumen lies only in language and 
its vagaries rather than the substance of truth will not be good deceivers, and those who 
understand will never maliciously deceive. Just as medicine provides for the good of the 
body, so should rhetoric, the use of language, do for the soul (270b4-9). But this rhetoric 
28 This is, of course, the Socratic and Platonic principle that everyone wants what is good, but most are 
mistaken as to what this is: ou&is SICWV apapraV£1. This idea is explored with rhetoric in mind in the 
Gorgias 458e3-460c6, where the conclusion is that the true rhetorician must understand justice and 
therefore be just. 
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is true rhetoric, and one can only produce or develop that when one understands the 
subject matter. 
So how does one produce good, 'proper', rhetoric? Clearly, one has to be taught. And the 
teaching, if it is to be "rixvn"29 (270e3) must explain what it is that rhetoric is aimed at. 
That, of course, is the nature of soul. Only then can rhetoric become truly useful, because 
only once one understands soul can one produce the correct sort of rhetoric for each 
different soul type (270e2-27lc4). One must be taught these in the abstract first, then 
apply those abstract teachings "iv ra(s npa~emv" ("in real life" or, more literally, "in 
activities") (27lcl0-272b4). In other words, one must recognise the different types of 
examples of the different types of soul and provide each example with its corresponding 
example of its corresponding type of rhetoric. One must understand the abstract world 
that lies behind the particular, and apply each to the other. Rhetoric, the use of 
ypaJlJlara in A..Oyot, can only be done properly by someone who knows what they are 
talking about: Socrates looks like the perfect rhetorician - as well he should, also looking 
like the perfect philosopher. 
But this idea of rhetoric, as Plato is aware, is rather an oversimplification. There is still 
the major problem of the tool one has to use to convey the right sort of speech to the right 
sort of soul. Language is still the key issue. It can be used to deflect from truth, even to 
create its own falsehoods that can masquerade as truth. No one could lie without 
29Rowe translates as "in a scientific way", but I would like to remove the emotionally provocative, and 
destructive, science vs. philosophy debate from any translation, for reasons which l hope will become clear, 
and replace it with something like "in an expert way". 
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communication, and Plato seems to view it at times as a main source of misconceptions 
about reality as in the Cratylus, where flux and change in language does not mean, as 
some would claim, that there can be no constants. The majority does not understand its 
difficulties, or simply prefers to ignore them. Socrates, when talking about the orator 
Tisias' methods, says "on -;!2 Tctma, m:lA.at rypcls, npiv Kat ai napcWciv, 
rorxavopcv A.iyovrcs ros apa rovro ro clKos rozs 1rOMolS Ot' opou!nryra rov rou 
aA.ryOovs rorxavct iyyzyvopcvov· ras oi Of.lOlO!Tfras apn Ot7JWOf.1cV on navraxov 
0 n}v al.:ryOctaV clows KaAA.tara in[ararat cVptGKclV." ("Tisias, we have for some 
time been saying, before you came along, that this 'probability' comes about in the minds 
of ordinary people because of a resemblance to the truth; and we showed only a few 
moments ago that in every case it is the man who knows the truth who knows best how to 
discover these resemblances.") (273d2-6). The probability which he is talking about is 
that which concerns the orator's case: ifhe thinks his client will be better believed if a 
probable story is given rather than an explanation of what actually happened, then the 
rhetorician will give the probable story. Probable is given a definition in this context by 
Socrates' interpretation of what he believes the rhetorician Tisias would say: "ro dKos i] 
ro rcf.> nA.ryOct OOKOvv" ("the probable is just what most people think to be the case") 
(273bl). The rhetorician thinks he should fit what he says, not the way that he says it but 
what he actually describes, into what the audience is ready to accepe0. This is, of course, 
the very opposite of the Socratic and Platonic attitude. Plato has no respect for the 
30 There is an acceptance here that truth is often what is not seen as likely. This offers a defence for Plato's 
fondness for paradox, because A.oyos will conquer persuasion, and truth is its own persuasion. It also offers 
another comment on the workings of language: words and grammar cannot, in one sense, cope with truth 
and so end up in a paradox, but that paradox itself reveals something about language and truth. A paradox 
is aware of itself as language that is struggling towards a truth which is different from and 'other' than it. lt 
accepts that the only way it can get at 'truth' is to go against our common sense on a linguistic level, but to 
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majority, only a respect for what is right. He has no time for such a conservative attitude, 
where nothing new is said to the people because any orator merely interested in a 
superficial victory knows that they will agree with what they believe they already know. 
Plato is not interested in pleasing the people, but rather forcing them into philosophy so 
that they may be truly happy. A rhetorician who gives in to such sycophantic methods has 
no aim other than to be believed and respected by the people: Plato is searching for the 
right answers to Socrates' questions, not those answers that make him popular. Any 
AOyos that "frequently says goodbye to the truth" ("noMa ct7rOVTa xatpclV TtP 
a.A,.,ecl'') (272e5) is not a proper A.oyos, but merely and falsely claims to be one. 
Anyone who is to be "rcxvucos Adymv" ("an expert in the skill of speaking") (273e3) 
must understand the world around him, must be able not only to understand the souls of 
his audience and be able to speak accordingly, but also must be involved in what seems 
like collection and division: "Kat Kar' clOTJ Tc Otatpctcr(}at ra ovra Kat Jlli!- loiq 
ovvaros :17 KaO' Ev SKaarov 7rcplAaJ1{3avctV" ("and be capable of dividing up the things 
that are according to their forms and embrace each thing one by one under one kind") 
(273e 1-3 ). This is further explained at 277b5-c6: "nptv av ns TO Tc aATJOis iKaarmv 
ovrm nOn Kat OtaKOaJ.lf1 TOV Adyov, ll"OlKlAn piv 7r0lKLAoVS l/fVXn KatnavapJ.lOVlOVS 
OLOOVS A..Oyovs, anA.ovs oi anA-fi, ov nporcpov ovvarov rixvn saccr(}at Ka()' oaov 
stand as sensible when the concept it is trying to put across is properly considered. That a paradox is also a 
piece of rhetoric will be considered later. 
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nec/JVK& p&razetpta0ijvat ro Mywv yevos" ("Until a man knows the truth about each of 
the things about which he speaks or writes, and becomes capable of defining the whole 
by itself, and having defined it, knows how to cut it up again according to its forms until 
it can no longer be cut; and until he has reached an understanding of the nature of the soul 
along the same lines, discovering the form which fits each nature, and so arranges and 
orders his speech, offering a complex soul complex speeches containing all the modes, 
and simple speeches to a simple soul - not before then will he be capable of pursuing the 
making of speeches as a whole in a scientific way, to the degree that its nature allows." 
To give a A.oyos, one must understand its contents. 
But there remains a problem. When someone can do this, he will be "r&zvtKOS A.Oywv 
1rEpl KaO' oaov 8vvarov avOpwnq/' ("an expert in the skill of speaking to the degree 
possible for mankind") (273e3-4). This is then partly explained: "ovx £v&Ka rov Uy&tV 
KUl7rpCXr'r&lV npos avOpwnovs 8&1. Dta7rOV&la0at rov awc/Jpova, aAA.a rov O&OlS 
K£XUPlOJ1eva piv Uy&lV 8vvaa0at, K&xaptOJleVWS 8i npaH&lV ro m1v &ZS 8vvaptv" 
("the sensible man ought to work through [how to become an expert in speaking] not for 
the purpose of speaking and acting in relation to men, but in order to be able both to say 
what is gratifying to the gods and to act in everything, so far as he can, in a way which is 
gratifying to them.") (273e5-8). Humans are described as "opo8ovAOLS" ("fellow-
slaves") (273e9) who are not to be gratified, but rather we should aim to satisfy 
"8&onorats ayaOozs r& Kai ic; ayaOmv" ("good and noble masters"31 ) (274al-2); 
31 Lit: "good masters and from good [ones]" (my translation). 
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"psyaA.mv yap £vsKa nspursov, oux ws oo c5oKsis32" ("for it is for the sake of great 
things that the journey is to be made, not for those you have in mind") (274a3). The 
purposes of philosophy, it seems, are not even those which are within the human sphere; 
they concern things which are higher, which are godlike. But this does not make their 
pursuit meaningless, because "smzstpovvn rot rois KaAoLS KQAOV Kat naazstv on av 
up avpf3fi na()siv" ("for a man who even attempts what is fine, it will be fine too to 
endure whatever turns out for him") (274a8-bl). This does not appear to make very much 
sense. How can Plato hold both that it is good and useful to pursue philosophy and that 
the object of pursuit is outside the human world? Such a paradox serves its purpose 
perfectly, encouraging any reader to pursue its meaning. 
Earlier in the dialogue, as an introduction to his speech in a mythological style about the 
soul being like a chariot and its horses, Socrates says about any description of the soul: 
"otov J-lSV &an, navrn navrws ()sias dvaL Kat paKpas DL1Jy~asws, ([> c5i SOLK&V, 
av()pw7rLV1JS rs Kat &A&rrovos" ("to say what kind of thing it is would require a long 
exposition, and one calling for utterly superhuman powers; to say what it resembles 
requires a shorter one, and one within human capacities") (246a4-6). We cannot directly 
describe soul as humans; it is beyond us. But this does not prevent us talking about it; we 
just cannot 'talk it'. In an attempt to discuss justice, justice itself does not pour out of 
anyone's mouth, only words about it. The words are different from the thing they are 
describing. This is why in the myth about writing (274c5-275b2) those who are taught 
only by ypappara have "aot!Jfas ... c5o~av" ("an appearance of wisdom") rather than 
32 lit: "for it is for the sake of great things that one must make a circuit, not for what you have in mind" (my 
translation). 
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true wisdom. The language is presented as the tool for the communication of truth, but it 
is not truth itself: it is more likely to be the wrapping that lies around truth, the falsehoods 
men see and believe to be the truth. They may know the words and how to use them, the 
grammar and the tricks, but they do not understand the concepts in themselves which the 
words are standing for. It is like looking at a building and only seeing and noting the 
paintwork whilst ignoring the structure. Once someone is taught how to read, all words 
become accessible to them, but this has no bearing on their understanding of the world 
around them if they do not attempt to engage with what it is that the words are standing 
for and attempting to describe. Each of these things is, we are told at 247c6-7, 
"alJXVJlaros rs Kat aCJX7JJ1artcrros Kat ava</J~s" ("without colour or shape and 
intangible") and will never be celebrated "Kar' ac;zav" ("as it deserves") by any earthly 
"noz7Jr7Js". This is entirely logical, because if something has no dimensions and occupies 
no space, then it becomes indescribable in language. When we try to discuss justice, we 
have to deal in examples of justice, whether real or attempts at an ideal. An intimate 
knowledge of the workings of language and how to work it so that it works for you 
comes to nothing if there is not an admission that language is in its own world, a world 
which is an attempt to mimic "ovaia ovrws o&aa" ("being which really is") (247c7). 
That admission also has to take account of language being a human invention - a human, 
and therefore imperfect, attempt to represent the divine and perfect unchanging reality, 
which we will never be able to see with our eyes. Consistent, unchanging, complete 
reality is only approachable through the intellect. 
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Words are not only imperfect as a means of communication when one is searching for 
somethi~g, but they can go one stage further and even be dangerous. At 275c5-e6, 
Socrates specifically attacks the written form of language. We are told that anyone who 
believes either that they have left behind a "rixv11v ... iv ypappam" ("piece of expertise 
in writing") or that they can gain anything "aa4Jer; Km f3if3awv" ("clear or certain") 
from what they read, is full of simplicity "nA..iov n oiopcvos cl vm A6your; 
ycypappivour; rov TOV ci86ra vnopvijaat ncpt d>v av n ra ycypappiva" ("in 
thinking that written words were anything more than a reminder to the man who knows 
the subjects to which the things written relate"). The problem here is interpretation: 
"ravrov 8€ Kat oi A6yor 86c;atr; )1BV av ms n 4Jpovovvras avrovr; MyctV, iav 8i n 
&pn TWV kyopivmv f3ouA6pcVOS JWOc'iv, &v n 01JpatVcl J10VOV ravrov act" 
("Similarly with written words: you might think that they spoke as if they had some 
thought in their heads, but if you ever ask them about any of the things they say out of a 
desire to learn, they point to just one thing, the same every time") (275d7-9). All the 
written words can do is sit on the page and be interpreted. The words by themselves 
cannot lead someone to wisdom, that only comes from understanding the concepts which 
the words stand for. Someone can use or read the words who has no understanding of 
what they mean at all. But he may at first appear to have an understanding, especially if 
he is using the words in an established phrase. To find out whether the user has an 
understanding or the phrase a sensible and useful meaning, one must examine what it is 
that the words mean. The learning of a maxim contributes nothing to education. One can 
only learn through dialectic, through questions and answers given and received with the 
joint purpose of getting at the truth. That is the greatest thing that Socrates taught: he said 
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he knew nothing, he laid down no theories, but he emphasised through practice the 
importance of never accepting the word of a self-proclaimed 'expert'. But one cannot 
engage in an argument or discussion with a written word: "auras yap our' apuvaaOar 
~ 
ours {3o1JOijaar 8vvaros avrcp" ("for it is incapable of defending or helping itself') 
(275e5). There is a gap between the word and what it describes. What it means to the 
author can be different, however subtly, from what the reader takes it to mean, and the 
author is not present as the words' father to make clear what he means and then defend it. 
The only defence he can offer is what he writes, and that can never be properly 
questioned. Because his A.oyOl are "a8vvarwv psv avrols A.Oycp f3o7JOsiv" ("incapable 
of speaking in their own support") they therefore must also be "a8vvarwv 8i iKavros 
raA.7JOij 8t8asm" ("incapable of adequately teaching what is true") (276c8-9). Learning 
goes hand in hand with questioning, and teaching with properly defending: they are as 
linked as "psv" and "8i". Firstly, one cannot find out exactly what the author means, and 
secondly, even if they did write in such a way as to make the interpretative gap nearly 
nothing, like, for example, Aristotle, then they would still not be present to defend what 
they say to see if it is true. AJI this also assumes that the author knows what he is talking 
about. However, as we have seen at 273e3-4, it is doubtful whether any human can ever 
know completely these most important and most abstract things. They are to be aimed at, 
but perhaps never attained in mind, and almost certainly never in words. There are 
problems with the spoken word as a philosophical too] too, but the written version is just 
an "d8wA.ov" ("phantom") (276a9). It does not live, but it is forever the same. 
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A Adyos is only of any use when given by someone who understands what it contains, 
but even then a written A.oyos cannot be taken entirely seriously because it cannot, by 
itself, teach anything. The reading of philosophy, or indeed of anything, is not the act of 
philosophy. That is only the thinking, the question and answer dialogue. This does not 
dismiss the written word by any means, but even if it is written by one who knows what 
he is writing about, then its reading remains a game and a pastime. No new knowledge 
will emerge from the reading of a book, only from some discussion of it. And so at 
276d8, we get a phrase where Socrates and Plato come together to speak as one to the 
reader: the budding philosopher, rather than attending drinking parties or the like, will 
"avri rovrc:ov ols Air eo na{t;c:ov 8u:lsd' ("spend his time amusing himself with the 
things I say, instead of these"). Who is the subject of Aiyc:o? Socrates 'says' it, but Plato 
writes it. In such a self-consciously written work, and necessarily so because of its 
subject matter, Plato suddenly shines through. The reader can 'hear' Socrates' discussion 
in the words that he reads, but is also told how to deal with what he is reading about not 
trusting anything in writing. Whilst Phaedrus is being urged by Socrates to amuse himself 
with Socrates' philosophy in this play set up by Plato, the reader is being urged by Plato 
himself to amuse himself with what Plato writes, which is this entire dialogue and all of 
Plato's works, including the words of all his characters. Phaedrus is right to call writing 
playful, especially at this point. As a character contemporary to Socrates, he understands 
what he is saying: as a creation of Plato's, he can point towards the difficulties of truth in 
writing33. It might seem odd that a written book should contain within its conclusion: 
33 His following comment on the man "rou iv A.Oyots 8uvaf.1CVOV nalt;cLV, 8ucaLOaVVT]S re l(al alliuv 
thv Uycts nipt f.luOoA.oyovvra" ("who is able to amuse himself with words, telling stories about justice 
and the other subjects you speak of') (276e2-3) must surely have some influence on how we try to read the 
Republic in particular, but perhaps also on all of the Platonic corpus. I will come to this later. 
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"ovoeva rrmrrore Adyov ev J.Lerpcp ov8 avev perpov jleyaA:rJS a~wv cmovoijs 
ypal/Jijvat" ("nothing has ever yet been written, whether in verse or in prose, which is 
worth much serious attention") (277e6-8), but writing by itself cannot contain the 
answers for which Plato searches. The word oucaLOaUVTJ is meaningless by itself it is 
only the concept which it stands for that has a value, and that concept cannot be 
completely represented in language because language is incapable of describing such 
abstracts. By learning a dictionary style definition of justice, one does not understand 
justice. One may be able to give an answer to the question 'what is justice', but it would 
not stand up to scrutiny. Justice, as with all concepts, is outside of language. It is possible 
for Plato to persuade through the written word that rhetoricians are only interested in the 
so-called truths that are perpetuated through language, in the transference of opinion from 
one to another through words, and to deny that language can itself contain the concepts, 
the forms, which he sought to understand, but he must admit that therefore his writings 
do not convey them either. This does not diminish what he wrote. As long as it is not 
taken completely seriously, as long as it leads to thinking and discussion, his work is 
useful. Let us assume that he understood his subject matter to a very great degree, there is 
too much evidence not to. But he understood it to such a degree, that he knew a word was 
nothing but a pattern that somehow manages to be a sort of physical representation of a 
concept the shape of 'justice' as a scrawl has no morality or justice about it. Those letters 
placed in that order occupy a strange world: they stand for and mean an indefinable 
concept which no-one can ever see but someone may understand (if only in theory, as it 
were). We can never see Justice, and in the gap between the word and the concept, each 
person treads their own route and reaches a slightly different area of understanding of the 
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concept. The orator is satisfied as long as he wins the argument or the crowd; he is happy 
to live in a world of words and interpretation. Only the philosopher can possibly have 
knowledge rather than opinion, by knowing the whole concept, outside of and without 
examples; the concept itself as itself; knowledge inexplicable in words. 
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Language in the search for understanding 
The ideal and the physical 
But Plato's only means of conveying philosophy was through language. He may dismiss 
it as not idea), but he nevertheleSS must USe it: "ra yap aawpara, /CcXMlara ovra Kaz 
piytara, Mycp }lOVOV aMq.J 8& ov&vt aa</Jws Dcl/CVVrat" ("for the things that are 
without body, which are finest and greatest, are shown clearly only by verbal means and 
by nothing else") (Statesman 286a5-7). The Cratvlus has shown us that names cannot be 
the goal of philosophical inquiry, an idea confirmed by at Statesman 26le5-7: "Kav 
Dta</JVMSnS TO }lry 07rOVDac;ctV int !OZS OVO}laOlV, lrAoVOlW!cpOt; cLS !0 yijpat; 
ava<J>av~an </Jpov~acws" ("and if you persevere in not paying serious attention to 
names, you wiJJ be seen to be richer in wisdom as you advance to old age"). The 
Phaedrus has confirmed that words and concepts are very different things, and that 
language cannot express truth completely, a principle which leads the Eleatic Stranger of 
the Statesman, when trying to explain that an action can be called both courageous and 
excessive, to ponder at 306d9-10 "ap' oi:Jv 8vvaros avro av ycVOLJ11JV, wancp Kat 
8tavoovpat, 8ta Mywv iv8cisaa()ai aat;" ("then would I be able, I wonder, to show it 
to you in words just as I have it before my mind?"), because such a task it not as easy as 
the young Socrates imagines. It is not merely a question of finding the right words: the 
right words may just not be able to exist, so one must find the best possible instead. 
However, whatever words one uses to express an idea, one must remember that the words 
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are always secondary to concepts. A passive audience to language does not get at any 
truth and is not useful to philosophy; an examination of the concept reveals whether it is 
true or not, because "To ya'p a.A7]8is ou8irroTc iAiyxcTat" ("for you cannot refute the 
truth") (Gorgias 473bl0-ll). One might be able to refute the words of an argument, but if 
that argument is bedded in truth, then no amount of rhetorical or sophistic trickery can 
show the world to be other than how it is. This means that we must search for concepts, 
because any proper use of words involves having some understanding of the concepts for 
which they stand. For example, in the Statesman at 280a3-6, we are asked "t/>WJ1cV 8& 
Kat ulj>avnKryv, ooov brt rfj TcOV l)lanwv ipyaaiq. J1EYWTOV ryv jl(Jpwv, J11]Div 
8wlj>ipctv n.Aryv ovoJlan TaVT1JS rijs iJlaTwvpyucijs, KaBancp KaKct TOTe n}v 
{Jam.Aixryv rijs no.AtnKijs;" ("and shall we say that weaving too, in so far as it 
represented the largest part in relation to the manufacture of clothes, does not differ at all, 
except in name, from this art of clothes-making, just as in that other case we said that the 
art of kingship did not differ from that of statesmanship?"). We, like young Socrates, 
must agree. The name is just a thing that stands for a concept and represents it in 
communication if both the speaker and the listener (or author and reader) understand the 
concept. In the Sophist 267d4-e2, we see that names are needed as labels for category 
divisions, but what count are those categories, not the labels we give them. However, this 
can only be done using that problematic tool of language. However, as we have seen, it is 
by no means a perfect tool. The clash between the ideal and the physical is set up. 
Statesman 269d5-6 sums up the problem that we, as humans, face: "To KaTa TaUTa Kat 
waaUTWS EXclV ad Kat TaUTOV dvm ro'is JrcXVTUJV BclOTcXTOlS npOmJKcl JlOVOlS" 
("remaining pennanently in the same state and condition and being pennanently the same 
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belongs only to the most divine things of all"). We are tying to understand these most 
divine things, but the world around us is in a constant state of change. We are incapable 
of capturing these etemals in language, as is shown in the Statesman when the talk is of 
laws. 
At 294a6-c8, it is agreed that "voJlOS OUIC av 1Wf£ 8uvatro ro f£ aptmov Kat ro 
DliCalOrarov aKpt{3ros rramv ctjla 1rcpzAa.f3rov ro {3ilrtmov imrcl-rr£LV" ("law could 
never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so 
prescribe what is best") (284a I O-b2). This is because human affairs are never simple; 
they are always changing and throwing up new scenarios. Any written law, however, is 
simple because it cannot extend to cover every eventuality. It also has to be permanent 
and unquestionable: there must be a Rule of Law, or the laws are useless. This means that 
situations will arise with which the law cannot cope34. It is far from ideal, but the 
Stranger must ask "8ui ri 8r]rror' o&v avayKai'ov VOJ10(l£r£lV, irr£ZDrJ7rcp OUIC 
opOorarov 0 VOJlOS,·" ("why then is it ever necessary to make laws, given that law is not 
something completely correct?") (294cl0-dl). For his answer, he must compare an ideal 
state with a physical, human one. The method used for this is to form an analogy between 
a ship and the state. The problems of laws are explained from 294d3-296e4, where their 
rigidity is shown. They are in one sense necessary because no ruler can look over the 
shoulder of each member of his state before every action and so there must be a set of 
rules, written or passed down in custom, which people must obey. But if the leader 
wishes to change these laws, even if he wants to improve them and make them more just, 
34 Such as, perhaps, Socrates'. 
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he must force his changes onto the ruled. The laws almost become more important than 
justice, because according to the mechanisms of state, it is the laws that have to have 
priority in order for them to be worth anything at all. In the ship analogy of296e4-297b4, 
we see that the steersman of the ship does not have a set of written laws which he 
consults before making a decision, but he controls the boat according to his knowledge as 
a steersman. His expertise is in charge. At 297e7-300a2, we are shown how a compete 
adherence to laws in areas such as medicine or navigation prevents any kind of creativity: 
if laws are written down which these skills must always work within, then anyone finding 
out anything new about how to judge the weather or how to heal a patient would not be 
allowed to use their new skill because it would be outside the defined definition of what it 
is that a doctor or steersman may do. The people who carried out jobs under such 
conditions would need to do no more than follow the rules: they would need no expert 
knowledge in their field, indeed any such knowledge that was not accounted for within 
the rules of that field would not be allowed. Clearly, in these situations, a Rule of Law 
would stifle any progress and discourage an expertise in a subject. But still, the Stranger 
points out at 300a3-c3 that it is better to have a Rule of Law within a state than to have 
the laws changed by people who have no expert knowledge in ruling, since the laws 
would have been created from experience but changed for personal profit. This would 
lead to chaos within any state. The option of having written laws is "o&vr&pos" ("second 
best") (300cl). These written laws are, in some sense, imitations of true statesmanship 
(300c4-6). There are degrees of how good these imitations can be, but they can never be 
perfect: no written law can completely imitate the knowledge of the perfect statesman 
(300e 1-1 0). No state, therefore, can be perfect: the best that is humanly possible is to 
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have the Rule ofLaw with laws that imitate, as far as possible, "n]v alt1J8tv1}v E/CetV1JV 
n]v rov EVOS' pera rexV1JS' apxovros noJureiav" ("that true constitution of one man 
ruling with expertise") (300e12-301 al ). We will never have a full understanding of the 
permanent 'justice' or 'statesmanship', and so we will never be able to have an ideal 
state. We must create the best definition of how a perfect state might run and set this out 
• 
in laws, and treat that definition as permanent. But we must remember that those laws are 
not a complete definition of the perfect state but imitations of an ideal, and so they must 
be left open to improvement, whilst ensuring that any changes to them are for the best 
interests of the state. Indeed, at 303b4-6, the Stranger compares the perfect state to 
divinity, whereas the other six forms of government (aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, 
monarchy, lawful democracy and lawless democracy) are all human forms of running a 
state. The perfect state of the single knowledgeable statesman is an ideal that should 
always be aimed at but can never be achieved. The human statesman must compromise 
with the problems of living in the physical. The comparison with names is made by 
Lane35: "if names must be understood as tools rather than as evidence, laws too must be 
understood as tools rather than as the dead and unalterable hand- the mortmain- of the 
past." The perfect statesman gets his authority from his knowledge of the ideal, but we 
have to use laws to represent as best we can our attempts at that knowledge: pure ideas 
cannot exist in language, but we must try to represent them as best we can in words. 
This difference between the ideal and the physical is continued when the Stranger talks 
about the statesman's need for rhetoric, generalship and judging. At 303e7-305c7 we see 
that these arts are not the art of statesmanship. They are "ripza Kaz avyy&vij" ("precious 
Js Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 155. 
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and related") to statesmanship, but subordinate to it ("tm1Jperovv" (304e 1) about 
rhetoric, "tm1JpEntn}v" (305b8) about generalship, and "vn7]pinv" (305c7) about 
judging). They are not a part of the ideal statesman's art. They are similar to that art, and 
must go along with it in the human, physical version. Like laws, they are necessary for 
the running of a state. 
The idea of the necessity of rhetoric is also expressed in the Gorgias. At 502c5-7, 
Socrates says "tj>ipe 81}, E1 ns neptiJ.ot rijs nozl}aaos 7rcX01JS To TE J.lEAoS Kat pvOJ.lov 
tCaz To J1Erpov, &Mo n ij Adyot y{yvovTat To ktnopevov,·" ("well now, suppose that 
we strip all poetry of melody and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?"). The 
thing that is left when all the dressing has been taken off, the thing that the decoration is 
there to convey is Adyos. In an ideal world, one would only need the pure Adyos because 
it should be self-evidently true and need nothing extra in order for it to be conveyed or 
win an argument. But we do not live in an ideal world. Indeed, Socrates himself has to 
use rhetoric. So when, for example, he claims that he is searching for the truth rather than 
the victory in the argument, with a clear implication that rhetoricians use rhetorical tricks 
in order not to loose arguments rather than sort out the question at hand, he says: "Trov 
q8iws J.lEV av ikyzOivTWV El n J.lfi aA1]8is .Aiyw, q8iws 5' av iky~aVTWV El ns n 
J.lfi aA.1]8is .Aiyot, ovtC a7]8imepov J.lEVTav ikyz()ivTwv ij iky~avTwv" ("I am one 
of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which- is not true, and very 
willing to refute anyone else who may say what is not true, and quite as ready to be 
refuted as to refute") (Gorgias 458a3-5). Socrates is undoubtedly being rhetorical with his 
repetition ofq8iws and i.Aiyzw. Even in separating himself from the ways of 
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rhetoricians, he is necessarily rhetorical himself If one wants to convey a truth, one has 
to do so in language. If one wants people to listen to that language, it has to be well 
constructed. One has to employ rhetoric: "q P1JTOptKT, apa, ws EOLICEV, 7rcd}ovs 
01JJ.lLOVpyos ianv 7rLCJTEVTIKqS aM' ov OLOaC11CaMKqS 7rcpl TO OLK.au5v 're Kat aOLICOV" 
("then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about 
the just and the unjust, but gives no instruction about them") ( 454e9-455a2). People 
cannot be persuaded of the truth unless the language in which it is presented is well put 
together, whether that is as clear an exposition of the truth to be conveyed as is possible, 
or a device like a paradox to force the audience to consider the point for themselves. 
Rhetoric is not necessarily a bad thing. 480b7-48lb5 shows us that rhetoric can be used 
for good: it can be used during accusations of injustice, if those injustices really did take 
place, which will lead to punishment and then happiness for the accused (480b7-d7); or it 
can be used to protect an unjust enemy from punishment, which will lead them into a 
miserable life ( 480e5-481 b5). Rhetoric, of course, can also be exploited for the bad, and 
this is how it is generally portrayed in Plato. At 479b3-c6, for example, amongst the 
things that the unjust men do to try and save themselves from a potentially immediately 
painful catharsis is to cultivate "how to speak persuasively" ("ws mfJavwrarot Uyctv") 
( c3-4). The others are to surround himself with money and friends. The power of rhetoric 
is again acknowledged, but it is here seen almost as a natural evil, because rhetoric has no 
necessary relationship to the truth, indeed it is often employed to deny the truth and 
propound a lie. The case of the past Athenian rhetoricians such as Pericles, as taken up by 
Socrates at 515c4-517a6, demonstrates the point about the uses of rhetoric. The great 
names of Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles were all, after years of controlling 
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the people of Athens, punished by them; "t:l olJrot pr]ropt:s ryaav, OV'l't: rfj a.AT]Otvfi 
p7]roptKfj iwwvro - ov yap av isbrt:aov - OV'l't: rfj KOAaKlKfj" ("and therefore, if they 
were rhetoricians, they used neither the true art of rhetoric (or they would not have fallen 
out of favour) nor the flattering form of it") (517a4-6). The real rhetoricians could not 
fool the audience forever; we have to ask what the ideal rhetorician would do. He 
probably would not even exist, because truth, ideally, is its own persuasion and should 
need no dressing up. But a pure Adros is impossible to communicate in the physical 
world; in expressing it in language, one must use the best words in the best combination 
possible, in order to ensure that those who do not understand 'what-is-best' should be 
persuaded to do what is best. Such rhetoric is not ideal because the truth should be 
enough, but someone who conveys truth using the power of rhetoric will be more 
successful in spreading it than someone who tries not to. In using language, we are forced 
to use rhetoric to some degree. As long as that rhetoric is the tool of an attempt to 
communicate the truth to the best of human ability, it cannot be a bad thing. 
But humans may never have the capacity to get at the ideal directly. For example, in the 
Philebus, the talk at 51 a2-52b9 is of the possibility of pure pleasure, that is pleasure 
which is not proceeded by, mixed with, or resulting from pain, coming from pure things, 
such as a perfect circle or a single musical note. A hierarchy emerges in which the purer 
something is, the better that thing is and more pleasure can derived from its study, so that 
purity is best. But at 53a2-b7, Socrates talks about pure whiteness, saying that a small 
amount of pure white is far better than any amount of impure white. The reader must ask 
at this point whether pure whiteness is a physical possibility: does it not exist in its purest 
96 
form as an idea, an ideal concept? In the creation myth of the Timaeus, McCabe te11s us36 
that it can be read so that the world "is the product of a benevolent heavenly craftsman 
who reconciled the good sense of reason with the pig-headed workings of necessity and 
produced the world as we see it to be." In other words, our world is structured as, and 
therefore embedded in, the compromise between the ideal and the physical, the 
necessary. The white that we can physically see is never pure whiteness, because just in 
being an example of whiteness, it becomes physical and no longer pure. But the greatest 
pleasure is the pure pleasure which comes from the pure understanding of the purest 
things. However, the necessity of the physical world means that nothing is pure: a 
physical statesman must incorporate the skills of rhetoric, generalship and judging where 
the ideal concept of statesman as statesman does not include these skills; any knowledge 
or ~dea is no longer pure just by the act of its expression in language. But we must strive 
on in discussing these ideas, as this is the only way that we can improve our lives. And so 
we get Plato's dialogues: they do not claim to impart any truth directly or to leave the 
reader feeling that they understand fully the subject being discussed, but they form a part 
of the process of understanding. They demonstrate "iv Opr]vots re Kat iv rpaycp8{ats 
Kat KWJUfJDLats, J1~ rols 8paJ1am J10VOV a.A.M.l Kat rf1 rov fJ{ov GVJ.11raon rpaycpDLfl. 
dirges, tragedies and comedies, not only on the stage, but the whole tragi-comedy of life, 
distress and pleasure are blended with each other"37) (Philebus 50b 1-4 ). Plato's dramas 
reflect the frustrations and joys of the philosophical life. We can not escape the physical 
and live in the ideal, but nevertheless, this is what we should aim at. We must try to live 
36 McCabe, "Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato", N>eiron, Vol. XXV, No. 4, pg 60 
37 Translation J.C.B. Gosling, Oxford 1975 
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as best we can in the pure, even though the physical world is impure. We must try to 
understand the ideal. 
This point is demonstrated in the Republic. Tecusan38 says about 472cffthat "Socrates 
starts to explain that the whole inquiry we witnessed was a quest for exemplary items on 
which to 'fix our eyes', but 'our purpose was not to demonstrate the possibility of 
realizing such ideals'." It is after this that Socrates introduces the idea of the philosopher 
rulers. After some discussion, Adeimantus interrupts and says that what Socrates is 
saying about the beneficial effects of philosophy are only "A..Oytp" ("in words") ( 487c5), 
and that in fact philosophers are "alj)~OTOVS ratS 1Z"OMGZ YLYVOJ.lEVOVS" ("made useless 
to states" [my translation]) by their very profession. Socrates rather surprisingly agrees 
(487dl0). But his agreement can only be explained "8t' Eilcovos" (through giving a 
parable") ( 487e4-5). The argument will not consist of a bare, point by point run through 
of what Socrates means; rather it will demonstrate what he means. A truth will be seen in 
this E;,aov in a much clearer light than if Socrates tried to make it emerge from a pure ad 
hominem argument. However, the Eilaov itself is, of course, a part of an ad Adeimanton 
argument, through which Plato hopes more truths wi11 emerge for the real target of 
Socrates' words, the reader. 
487e4-488a7 acts as a justification of what is to foJiow. The State treats philosophers so 
badly that "ov8iv a.UO rowvrov 1Z"G1l"OV0os, a.v.a DEl EIC noA.A.Wv avro ouvayayEtV 
EtKa(ovra Kat anoA..oyoUJlEVOV V1Z"Ep avrmv" ("no single thing on earth is comparable 
38 Tecusan, "Speaking about the Unspeakable: Plato's Use oflmagery", Apeiron. Vol. XXV, No. 4, pg 73. 
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to it; and therefore, ifl am to plead their cause, I must have recourse to fiction, and put 
together a figure made up of many things"). The situation as it stands, the immediate and 
present one in which Socrates and Adeimantus are, is not to be understood by itself Plato 
is not going to explain systematically and exactly with real examples why philosophers 
are a;an}arot in the current state. That would not serve any purpose; rather we are going 
to be shown in an example the ideal that we should be aiming for in comparison to the 
way that we actually are. 
The wider context, of course, is the mythologising about an ideal state ruled by 
philosopher kings. Adeimantus, however, brings the discussion back into the 'real', 
physical, human world at 487c4-d5 by saying that whilst Socrates may dominate the 
discussion of the imaginary details and abstracts, the other in the discussion know that 
what occurs in words is different to what occurs in our lives: "br&t ro y& aA1]9is ov8iv 
n J.Lti.Uov raurn &x&tv" ("yet they are sure the truth is not on your side") ( 487c3-4 ). 
Adeimantus is pointing out that the world they all see around them is opposite to the ideal 
state that Socrates is creating in words. Socrates deals with this by once again moving the 
discussion from the factual and into the imaginary. 
The state as a ship analogy is useful here because it creates a small scale version of a state 
that allows the discussion to view the state as a whole and, implicitly, the state as a 
moving thing, always aiming to get somewhere. The simplification of Athenian 
democracy into the virtual mob rule of the imaginary ship is difficult to argue with, and 
the solidification of the concept of the state as a ship forces the focus onto the good of the 
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whole rather than any personal ambition: there can be no individual gain at the expense 
of the whole, because that would lead to a destruction ofthe state-ship and death to the 
individual who tried to profit. In this scenario, clearly the man who would be best as the 
captain of the ship is not he who shouts loudest or drums up the most support, through 
whatever means, but he who understands best all those things that lie behind running a 
ship. There is a mental, imaginably visible structure for what is fairly abstract in reality: 
the state as a whole, rather than merely the individuals in it; the thing that links the 
individuals together, which they control and which in turn supports them. Socrates could 
never talk about the actual state in which they lived to try to prove his point: they are all 
too involved. He is not interested in the tediosities of current politics. They are striving 
towards an understanding of justice in the abstract, with an imaginary, mentally 
constructed state as an example. Adeimantus does not seem to understand this difference 
between the ideal to be aimed at and the physical in which we live. He tries to drag the 
discussion back into human politics, and Socrates, through describing philosophers as 
UlJ>1JOTOt, shows how the ideal can defeat the physical in argument, and therefore the 
inadequacies of the real. 
Socrates' defence of philosophy is not to try and point out all the things that philosophers 
have contributed to society; that would be the approach of a politician, or perhaps of 
Adeimantus. Instead Socrates demonstrates that, while in his Athens philosophers are 
UlJ>1JOTOl, they should be the most useful and powerful people. Socrates takes 
Adeimantus' objection and demonstrates on a small scale both the difference between the 
ideal and the way things are in our world, firmly placing his flag in the ideal, and the 
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products of his journey into pvOoAdyovs: if the philosopher is he who understands the 
abstracts behind any example, then he should rule. In everyday reality, they are 
aXJJlJOTOl, because a misguided political system allows them no COntrol, but they have 
the potential to be the most useful people in any state. However, not only does the state 
have to be moulded so that philosophers can ensure the good of the whole, but also there 
has to be someone who is a true philosopher so that he can rule. He must completely 
understand all those concepts necessary for ruling and then he can see what abstracts the 
things that happen in the physical world are examples of: whether something is just or 
not, for example. But this man is only an ideal; this sort of knowledge is a target, 
probably not attainable by any human. By using the ship example, Socrates can use a 
skill, navigation, which is knowable in place of statesmanship, which is probably not 
understandable, and is certainly not practical in its purest form - the form Socrates is 
trying to prove to be most useful in this argument. In our world, the philosopher is 
"jlS'fSCOp0(JI(01COV TS ICal aOOMO,llJV ICal al.PlJOTOV" ("an idle chatterer, a star-gazer, a 
good-for-nothing") ( 488e4-489al ); in the ideal he is the best possible ruler. This is the 
fault of the system, but we must also ask whether someone can exist who has perfect 
knowledge, someone who is the perfect philosopher for the perfect system, someone who 
understands without examples. This is our aim, but progress towards this ideal must be 
carried out through the physical that we see around us. 
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Understanding through examples 
Rowe39 says that in A.Oyot, Socrates can see "things with at least some degree of success", 
whereas the visible world attracts us to glare at us so that we see nothing at all. The 
Timaeus says at 49a3-4 "vvv oi 0 Adyos EOLKEV EtaavayKac;ELV xaA£7Z'CJV Kat 
aJ.w8pov doos bnzEtpEiv AdyOLs EJllf>aviaat" ("but now the argument seems to require 
that we should set forth in words another kind, which is difficult of explanation and dimly 
seen"). The context is far from an argument in the conventional English sense, rather it is 
Timaeus telling a story about creation "rou JlclAzara ELKOTOS aVTEX,OJlEVOLS" ("holding 
fast to probability") (44c7-dl). There is this self-governing sense of Adyos, so that it 
demands the next stage. Even when its meaning is closer to 'stage-in-a-tale' than 
'argument', we see that one part leads to another; one story naturally demands another 
and so on until such a time as a rounded understanding is reached. Such an understanding 
is unlikely to come from just a literal explanation: our physical world is too far from the 
ideal to achieve any sort of understanding approaching perfection from it. The Adyos that 
is required at the next stage of this argument is both a 'literal' explanation within the 
context of the creation story, and a simile of that explanation in order to clarify it: 49b6-
50a5 gives the 'literal' explanation of the idea of One Matter, then 50a5-b5 gives the 
clarifying gold analogy so that the reader has an easy and familiar simile to help him deal 
with what Timaeus is talking about. Both explanations of the One Matter are referred to 
as "o avros 8q Adyos" (''the same argument") at 50b5. There is no difference between 
them in terms of their use to our understanding of the One Matter; they both fonn as 
39 Rowe, "Reflections ofthe Sun: Explanation in the Phaedo", Apeiron, Volume XXV, No 4, pg 89-lOI. 
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much a part of the attempt at understanding as each other. The simile is as important as 
the 'literal' in "&)~av 'C"E opeiw Kat aA:IJOels A.oytOJ.lOVS" ("correct opinion and true 
reasoning") (Ehilebus 11 b8), which are the best things, along with intelligence, thought 
and memory. 
However the question of how we study is inseparable from the question of what we 
study. The study of"ra nEpt rov KOOJ.tov" ("the things of this world") (Philebus 59a3) is 
concerned with "ra ytyvoJlEVa Kat YEV1JOOJ1EVa Kat yeyovora" ("things which are 
becoming, or which will or have become") (59a7-8) rather than "ra ovra ad" ("eternal 
being"). This means that such study has no access to "ro aJ.,1J()imarov" ("the highest 
truths") (59b8) because it deals in and with unstable things40. However the pure 
stabilities, such as whiteness, reveal truths if understood and are where knowledge is to 
be found. But we cannot study these directly. The only way we can try and find out what 
the label 'justice' is a label of, is by looking at examples of justice. Our language does 
not allow us to portray a pure abstract purely: we cannot describe the indescribable. 
Instead, we have to take the second best option. Ideally, we would study the abstracts 
themselves, but in our physical world we can only access these through those things that 
are "JlcUtara ... auyyevis" ("most akin") to them. It is these, presumably, that Plato is 
trying, in whatever way he chooses, to create: dialogues with characters saying things 
that are related to abstracts; things that are akin to truth. The explanation that holds fast to 
probability may be as close as we can hope to get to truth. 
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In the Sophist 22ld8-e3, we are told that the sophist is avyycvl}s (akin) to the angler 
because both are hunters. The interlocutors are trying to discover what a sophist is. They 
have just attempted a definition of 'angler' by continually dividing categories which they 
believe he belongs to, so that he is a hunter on the water who catches fish on a hook. That 
was a 'practice run': one suspects that they already knew precisely what was meant by 
the term 'angler', but they were practising their methodology. That method of category 
division will serve as a way of approaching much harder subjects, and so they start by 
asking what a sophist is. 
Immediately the comparison is made between the sophist and they angler. The method 
template will be used, but also the example used in that template. There is a clever 
economy: the method of division has shown what an angler is so that there is no 
confusion, and in using the simple example of 'angler', the method has shown itself to be 
useful. Both the sophist and the angler are agreed to take part in 'what it is to be a 
hunter'. But this is clearly not meant literally: the sophist is surely only a metaphorical 
hunter. However, the alignment of the two reveals the importance of 'kinship' to Plato in 
his method of explanation and understanding. The sophist searches out souls and 
ensnares them, but he is not what is normally understood as a hunter: if one said "picture 
a hunter" to somebody, they would not imagine a sophist. But similarly, neither would 
they imagine a fisherman. The tenn is taken and stretched. 'Angler' is a clear sub-section 
of' hunter', that section that hunts fish. 'Hunter' itself becomes not a noun describing a 
specific person -say, a man with a spear- but the heading of a whole category: anyone 
40 Which, as we have seen also in the Cratylus, is an answer, as far as Socrates is concerned, to the debate 
with Heracleiteans because if nothing ifthe same, then nothing can be known at all. 
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in the process of trying to find something to take for themselves, be it an archer, an 
angler, a gold-digger or a sophist. They are all separate and distinct individuals, and each 
activity is completely different in one sense, yet they all share in hunting: each one is 
trying to achieve a similar thing in that each one wants to capture something for 
themselves. The methods and goals for each are completely different, a rod and line for 
fish, a shovel and map for gold and linguistic craftiness for the soul, yet the non-specific 
motives and thinking for each are the same. Remove the physical examples and look at 
the example-less 'psychology', the pure and general abstract ideas untainted by physical 
things, and it is the same: it concerns a sort of search, a sort of conflict, and an expected 
gain. Each hunter expresses this desire in a different way, but each is still engaged in the 
same abstract activity. In an attempt to understand 'sophist', the rather metaphorical 
sense of hunter is useful: it allows us to see similarities and common themes. We can get 
towards an understanding of 'sophist' by looking at what it is similar to; what has the 
same general themes. 
This idea of studying one thing by looking at another is developed in the Statesman. At 
277dl-2, we are told "xaknov, ib 8atJ10Vt£, Jl~ napa8GirJ1am XPWJ1£vov iKavws 
ivodKvua6ai n rwv J1Ett;ovmv" ("it's a hard thing, my fine friend, to demonstrate any 
of the greater subjects without using models"). But then the Stranger tries to explain this 
comment. However, in a neat twist, he claims that he can only explain the idea that 
humans need examples of a subject to understand it, by using an example how examples 
help towards understanding: "napaoGirJJams, ib JlaKapt£, alJ J10l Kat ro napa8£ryJ1a 
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avro DEDET'/KEV" ("it has turned out, my dear fellow, that the idea of a 'model, itself in its 
turn also has need of a model to demonstrate it") (277d8-9). However, Plato does not 
make the claim about the power of napa8E[ypa that Lane wants him to. Lane claims41 
that napa8Efypara are the path from true belief to true knowledge. But the Stranger says 
at 278c6 that the combination of example with whatever it is that it is an example of fonn 
"p[av a.A.,.,eij &)~av" ("a single true judgement"). Lane's claim is appealing, but it 
seems that the possibility of true knowledge is not available to us. It may well be only 
theoretical. True knowledge involves knowing the thing by itself in the abstract. This 
approach to the subject through its kin, through those things which are like it, necessarily 
involves the subject's understanding through examples so that an abstract, it seems, can 
only be understood via examples of it. Our physical world is one of examples, and any 
attempt to progress into the perfect world of abstracts from our physical world must be 
done through those examples we have around us. Language does not allow justice to be 
defined in the abstract, indeed any definition is necessarily not the original but a 
conversion of it into another, physical form. Plato's attempt at getting towards an 
understanding of justice in the abstract in the Republic gives an example of a theoretical 
state that is an example of a just thing. All we have to help us get towards an 
understanding of an abstract are its examples that we can see or create around us. 
Statesman 278a8-c 1 explains that we can get towards understanding through seeing 
affinity and diversity~ how things fit together~ how general principles run through things 
that are, in a literal sense, different to each other; how, by placing things together 
41 Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 63-64. 
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(collection) their likenesses and diversities become clear (division) which makes them 
examples that can lead to this "Jliav aAIJ(}ij 8osav". 
It is the consistency within apparent diversity, seeing how certain things are like each 
other, which is important when dealing with examples. As Lane says42 : "example reveals 
what is common, a matter of self-same identity, and what is different and so achieves a 
c1arification of each entity being compared." Things must be understood in a context of 
what they are like and what they are different to: approaching a thing through a 
combination of its affinities and diversities leads towards a rounded understanding. One 
may never know a11 the things which are examples of an abstract, but the more one does, 
then the better one's understanding of that abstract wi11 be. 
Weaving is treated and discussed as a Adyos, rather than a mere picture, for two reasons. 
First, they have to practice on the easy things so that they can give Adyot of"n rwv 
J1Eu;ovcov" ("any of the greater subjects") (277d2) which cannot be pictured (285d9-
286b2)43 . But second, and more important surely, is that there is an affinity between 
weaving and statecraft which is to be explored and may reveal something about statecraft 
if it can be found. This comparison can only be carried out in Adyos because a picture of 
a weaver bears no resemblance to a king, but their tasks are similar. We can extract a 
Adyos from the image of weaving which we can apply to the image less statecraft, and 
further our understanding of statecraft by seeing it from another angle, seeing how it 
connects and is similar to something more understandable than itself We further our 
42 Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 69. 
43 Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 73-5. 
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understanding of statecraft b.Y approaching it through weaving: some A.Oyoz we 
understand in weaving become apparent in statecraft, but they are easier to get to in 
weaving because our image of it is clearer in that there is a (fairly?) universally accepted 
one. 
McCabe44 is useful here, on the way that understanding works through connecting 
similarites: "in the Republic the philosopher understands the symbiosis of the forms, 
analogous to the natural connection of the phenomenal world (hence the allegory of the 
Sun, 506ft). In the Theaetetus (184ft) reason contrasts opposites, compares similarites 
and thus comes up with the common terms such as sameness and difference. In the 
Phaedrus and later, the best way to do philosophy is to find systems and structures-
'collection and division'.'.45 I agree that "the first condition that Plato offers for 
understanding ... is connectedness, the interrelation of one Form (or one idea or 
whatever) to another. ,,46 Understanding only occurs within a context. . Tecusan47 agrees 
and adds to the idea of the necessity of a context for the thing to be understood so that the 
process of understanding can begin: "paradeigmata are indispensable (277d 1-2) because 
the mind cannot recognise familiar or known items when they are present in unfamiliar or 
unknown compounds (278c-d)."48 The mind works through association, connection and 
relationship: tallness and shortness have to be understood as being linked and only then 
will they be properly understood as themselves; but before that, one must consider the 
44 McCabe "Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 1992, pg 47-68. 
45 McCabe (see footnote 43) pg 53. 
46 McCabe (see footnote 43) pg 53; her italics. 
47 Tecusan "Speaking about the Unspeakable: Plato's Use oflmagery", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 
1992, pg 69-88. 
48 Tecusan (see footnote 46) pg 72. 
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variety of things that partake of each. Beauty is understood through its similarities to 
good, its opposition to evil and its relationship with £pros: but more than this, it is only 
really, fully understood when its place in the intelligent world is understood; when all its 
relationships to anything are understood. McCabe calls this "exhaustive'"'9 knowledge of 
all connections. It is an ideal to be aimed at: a pure target that is theoretically reached 
using the physical that surrounds us and holds us back to propel us towards exampleless 
understanding. 
It is not surprising that the process of understanding works in this way. The napa&tyJla 
is to be looked at so that its similarities with the thing it is a model of can be examined 
within the framework of the paradigm, in order to explore the indescribable in an indirect, 
but describable, way. Imitation is important: we must recognise similarities. The inter-
connectedness of things, the underlying principles running through apparently completely 
different things may reveal, or may be used to reveal, some sort of truth. This method is, 
of course, entirely in keeping with nature: our physical world 'resembles' another world 
which it 'represents' through a series of'likenesses', or, perhaps, it 'partakes' physically 
in things which are entirely abstract. It is natural, then, that our investigations should 
proceed by connecting various affinities and understanding the things in the world, 
sensible and mental, in their inter-connected relationships and similarities (collection) 
and their utter diversities (division). Things must be approached from within a context, 
then understood as themselves by themselves. We cannot understand what is completely 
foreign: we start the understanding procedure by contextualising and familiarising 
something - seeing what it is like that we already know and how - and only then can we 
move on to any abstract knowledge. But such complete knowledge seems beyond us. 
49 McCabe "Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 1992, pg 53. 
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The child, in the example of 277e2-278e3, may know how to read, but it does not then 
understand the more abstract ideas involved with language. At 306a8-308b9, those things 
that are grouped together and called 'virtue' are, in some cases, opposite and hostile 
things. They are virtuous when for the good, and not when for the bad: virtue is what runs 
through courage and carefulness to make them good. We can look back at history and 
decide whether actions were courageous or rash, careful or cowardly, and so use these 
examples to progress towards some kind of understanding of what virtue is. But these are 
much more slippery terms than those of reading and writing with which paradigms are 
introduced. In Plato's example of how one learns to read and write, one is taught by 
someone who knows the alphabet, a clearly defined thing.· But for the more slippery 
terms that Plato is really interested in, presumably one must already have some inkling as 
to what to use as a paradigm so that one can then rely on trial and error through cross 
referencing this paradigm in different contexts to find out how useful it is50. It is true that 
"in helping us to 'recognise' [different things partaking of different 'forms' in potentially 
apparently different ways] they [paradigms] create a bridge between trivial and important 
matters. "51 But how do we choose what paradigm to use? 
The chooser is required to project into the future and imagine one thing as similar and 
comparable to another which is not yet known and for which the whole process is 
working towards a definition. One wants to define 'x', so one wants to examine 
50This is of course Socrates' method of examination: ask for a definition of 'x'; receive a definition 'a'; 
give an example of'a' in a context that refutes 'a' as a definition- a different context to the one the giver 
of' a' thought about or expected. 
51 Tecusan pg 73. 
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something like it. One settles on 'y'. But in order to settle on something connected to 'x', 
one must at least have an inkling that there is a similarity between 'x' and 'y'. In some 
sense, one must know something about both 'x' and 'y', or one would try to compare 
things that shared no common principle. For the paradigmatic method to work, one of the 
interlocutors must have something like a true opinion as to what paradigm to use, or they 
must reject a paradigm that is revealed as unsatisfactory. There is a degree of something 
like knowledge of both the object of the inquiry and the paradigm used for that inquiry 
needed for the method to be profitable. This is not unreasonable: anyone engaged in a 
philosophical debate about it would already have come across 'statesmanship' and 
'statesman' in their human examples and would have an idea of what they do and what 
they should do. It is impossible to enter and continue a philosophical debate on a subject 
about which one has no prejudices (used in a Gadamerian sense to mean ideas in 
advance). It is the confirmation, re-working or re-founding of those prejudices which is 
the final aim. They are the necessary starting point of any discussion, and their use as 
tools of the discussion seems perfectly acceptable, perhaps even necessary, as long as the 
interlocutors are conscious of what they are doing and remain vigilant to ensure 
paradeigms are a tool not a misdirecting master. We need such methodological self-
awareness as we find in the Statesman. 
This idea of an a1most fore-understanding is given its own metaphor by Plato to help us 
understand it at Statesman 277d2-3: "K1VDVV£Vel yap ~JlCOV EICacrros otov ovap sl&os 
anaV'ra navt ab 1CaNV W(J1C£P Wrap ayvos l v" ("it looks as if each of us knows 
everything in a kind of dreamlike way, and then again is ignorant of everything as it were 
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when awake"). We all have a knowledge of statesmanship, but it is a knowledge that is 
like a dream: we are aware of it, but the more we try to pin it down, the harder it becomes 
until we realise that we cannot. The dream slips away as we try to explain it when we are 
awake. The use of paradigms, we are told at 278e4-ll, will help make the knowledge of 
the dreaming world into the knowledge of the waking world: it will solidify the pure 
thought with physical, recognisable and easy to handle examples of what was in the 
dreaming knowledge. The dream world is to do with general concepts and principles; the 
waking world is that of physical examples through which the dream world can be grasped 
and in which the beginning of a proper and full (perhaps conscious?) understanding can 
root itself Shinro52 makes a connection between the dreaming metaphor and Plato's use 
of myth: "The great Myth seems to give us that kind of true belief about the Statesman, 
but not exact knowledge. It is only a knowledge as in a dream. This is, I think, exactly the 
stage where we are now in search of the being of the statesman." This is not unreasonable 
since myths are connected to dreams in that they are completely a mental creation and 
occur in a dream world which is different from the physical one around us. But the myth 
is also a part of the physical world simply because it is created in language: it is, in this 
sense, a solidifying example of what the dream-like knowledge is like53. The example is 
just as valid if it has been created especially as it would be if it were merely an actual 
physical thing described. As long as the abstract runs through something and that 
something is describable, that something is usable as a paradigm. We just have to see the 
principle in it: it is the truth that counts, not the vessel that carries it. 
n "The Role ofParadeigmata in the Statesman", Reading the Statesman. ed. C. J. Rowe, 1995 
SJ See below for more on myths. 
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Ideally, poetry and representation would not be necessary for understanding. But in this 
physical world, where things can only be understood through, from and in opposition to a 
structure of likenesses within the complex mass of physical examples, the power of 
poetry and story-telling to provide loose analogies, guidelines, methods ofthinking about 
and ways of approaching truth, is necessarily part of the philosopher's art. As the ideal 
statesman needs no written laws but works from true knowledge alone and the human 
example of statesman must work within the strictest legislation, so the ideal philosopher 
works only in the mental, his philosophical tool wordless because he understands truth 
untainted by human interpretation or solidification. Clearly not only does he not need 
poetry, but it would even be harmful in any education aiming towards this state. But in 
the real, philosophers know that they must use whatever methods they can to try to 
contextualise whatever it is they are searching for; for only after understanding within a 
complete context can anything be completely understood without any context. One 
should use context to collect and divide, and when there is only one thing left, then there 
is contextless understanding. The path to understanding involves seeing something as 
relative to ourselves and to everything else, only once this has been done can that 
something be understood as relative to nothing; understood itself by itself and as itself. A 
myth allows whatever concept it is that is under investigation to be seen against a purely 
mentally created context: the myth world is imaginable but physical only in that it is an 
example in words. It provides another context within which to understand the thing under 
examination. The myths allow Plato to whatever examples of truth he wishes, his only 
limitation is the human imagination. He can create a world more ideal than ours, a world 
more suited to reveal the purity he hopes to find in truth. If the pure concepts he is 
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searching for are ideal, then the myths allow him to break away, to a large extent, from 
the limitations and 'sub-clauses' of the real (Socrates' analogy against Adeimantus in 
Republic IV, the ideal and physical statesman in Statesman, the problems oflanguage in 
the Cratylus and Phaedrus). Plato wants to remove anything as tedious and interfearing as 
human nature, so that the subject under investigation can remain pure and untainted by 
our world of examples. This constant tension between physical and ideal that runs 
throughout Plato condemns him as an art hater and a lover of the Muses, a historian and a 
liar, a fascist and a communis~ and a terrible proponent of self-contradiction. The beast 
and ro A.oytartKov continue to clash, and will do so for as long as we have to use the 
physical to try to look towards the ideal. 
Myth 
Lane claims 54 that "the resort to story-telling when analytical resources are apparently 
exhausted is a standard Platonic manoeuvre. In such cases (as in the Gorgias, the 
Republic, the Phaedrus) the stories told are genuine 'myths', employed as supernatural 
models or justifications to bolster a conviction which the analytical argument has sought 
to establish." But Plato does not "resort" to J1VOOL: they are as active a part of the A.Oyos 
as the dialectic. They are another, equally legitimate, way of displaying "nL. aawJ1ara, 
KclMtOTa ovra Kat J1Eytara" ("the things that are without body, which are finest and 
greatest") (Statesman 286a5-6) which can only be displayed "A.Oycp" ("by verbal means") 
'
4 Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 115. 
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(286a6). In the Gorgias, Socrates introduces his myth with "El 8i {3ovkt, aoi iyw, ros 
romo OVrWS ezEt, iOiA.w A.Oyov Ai~at" ("and in proof of what I say, if you have no 
objection, I should like to tell a story") ( 522e5-6). He is not giving a J1V0os in the 
following fantastical tale, but a A.Oros, a point which he himself makes explicit in the 
next few lines: "alCovE 81}, lflam, JlaAa ICaAov A.Oyov, ov a1J Jlev i!r1}an JlVOov, ws 
iyw OtJ1at, irw 8i A.Orov· ws aA1J(}ij ydp ovra aot Ai~w a JliAAm MyEtv" ("listen, 
then, as the story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I dare say that you may be 
disposed to regard as only a fantasy, but which, as I believe, is a true tale; what I am 
going to say, I offer as the truth") (523al-3). The mention of #CaMs A..Oyos must make us 
think of the Symposium, where this is the aim of the epros of the philosopher; in this 
case, the philosopher's offspring can be regarded as a J1V0os. Here, the story's status as a 
A..Oros seems to come from it containing some sort of truth. The problem is that truth is 
inexpressible in an absolute or direct description. The fantasy partakes in truth. It is like 
truth - and since it is in language, that is as good and close as it can get. 
We find exactly the same blurring of boundaries in the Timaeus. At 20d7-8, Critias says 
of his speech that is tO follow: "alCOVE 8ry, dJ £ro1CparES, Myov JlclAa JleV aT07rOV, 
navranaai yE Jl~V aA.1JOovs" ("Then listen, Socrates, to a tale which, though strange, is 
certainly true"). What follows is certainly not any direct or literal explanation, but is a 
recounting of the tale supposedly told to Solon concerning Atlantis. However much it 
appears to be nothing but a story, it is still described as a "naA.atov ... A..Oyov" ("old world 
story") (2la7). It sets the tone of story-telling and imaginative philosophy which Socrates 
believes will be "~v rwv A..Oywv ianamv" ("a feast of reason") (27b7-8). However, 
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Timaeus sets out the problems at 29c4-d3: "iav oov, Ch EwKpar£s, 1roAAd: 1ro.U..Wv 
nipz, 0£WV Kaz r~s rov navros y£via£WS, Jlq 8vvarot YlYVWJ1£0a m1.vrn m1vrws 
avrovs iavrol.s OJ10AoYOVJ1ivovs Adyovs Kat a1r7JKplf3WJ1ivovs ano8ovvaz, Jlq 
OavJlaans· ill' iav apa J11]D£vos i}rrov nap£XWJ1£0a £iKoras, ayam'iv lfJ~, 
J1£J1V1]J1ivovs cOS 0 Uywv iyw VJ1£lS r£ oi Kpzrazl/Jvmv avOpwn[vqv £xoJ1£V, WaT£ 
1r£pl rovrwv rov £iKora J1v0ov ano&xoJlivovs npin£z rovrov J11]Div £n nipa 
'qr£l.v." ("if then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of 
the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether and in every respect 
exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce 
probabilities as likely as any others; for we must remember that I who am the speaker, 
and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale which 
is probable and inquire no further.") This J1v0os is a Adyos which contains some 
affinities to truth, but as mortal men that is the best we can do. 
In the Gorgias, the story that is told deliberately confuses the issue with three mentions of 
Homer. He appears as 'proof at the start (523a3) concerning Zeus, Poseidon and Pluto 
dividing the empire. Homer is mentioned again at 525d6-7 in order that Socrates can use 
him to give examples of bad kings and tyrants who have gone into everlasting 
punishment after their deaths. Finally, the myth concludes with a quote from Homer 
Odyssey XI. 569 about Minos giving laws to the dead. This seems to contradict what 
Socrates has just said about this being a Adyos, because Homer is so central to the 
tradition of the J1v0os. His stories were seen as almost religious, but they were 
entertaining religion; they were stories from which amusement and wisdom could be 
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drawn. In popular culture, there was something like the idea of a J1V8os having elements 
of a Adyos in the way that Homer was regarded. His importance in the education of an 
Athenian is clear simply from the number of quotes which Socrates gives in the Platonic 
corpus. Homer was used as an ethical guideline, so that Socrates here taps into the 
popular prejudices concerning the value of Homer. His use as a source of 'authenticity' 
for the story brings some clarity as to how we are to regard it: on a broad level, if Homer 
is seen to have moral value and is (however misguidedly) used as a Adyos when he works 
within J1V8os, then so can Plato. One should treat Plato's J1V8ot as one would should 
Homer's: do not be literal, but find truth in them and discover that they are not throw-
away stories, but are as much a part of the overall Adyos as dialectic argument. 
Plato is tapping into the tradition that "poetry always had been a medium for 
communicating ethical teaching, indeed in the oral culture of early Greece it was the 
chief means by which ideas of any importance could be transmitted. "55 Indeed, Republic 
522a3-bl, we see the importance of poetry in the education of the guardians. As Smith 
puts it: "myths can help introduce a young man to a truth which will later receive 
dialectical examination."56 The Laws 887cfftells us that philosophy is easiest with those 
who have a true opinion from listening to childhood myths. The myths give a dream-
knowledge. They are an essential aid to the process of understanding in providing 
paradigms created especially for the situation, and paradigms which are diverting and 
interesting in themselves: "[myth] does not masquerade as all-embracing expertise, or 
feed the childish part of us at the expense of order in the soul, or disable our moral 
ss Murray, Plato on Poetry, CUP, 1996, pg 18: for more on this idea, see Murray pg 15-22. 
56 Smith, "Plato's Use of Myth in the Education ofPhilosophical Man", Phoenix 40, 1986, pg 23. 
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thinking, or luxuriate in spurious paradigms of behaviour. It does not challenge 
philosophy, but is a part ofp~ilosophy, which will assist in guiding the whole person 
towards a love of truth and goodness."57 For example, I again agree with Janaway that in 
the Phaedrus "the mythic speech gave the only account of the soul which was humanly 
possible, in terms of simile (246a4-6). "58 Myths "assist in guiding the whole person 
towards a love of truth and goodness" by drawing the reader into their mysterious world. 
Smith makes the connection with Aristotle's verdict on myths: "Aristotle in the 
Metaphysics (A 982b16) say~ that the lover of myth is a lover of wisdom; a lover of myth 
is one who is filled with a sel}se of wonder, and this is the first step for the 
philosopher. "59 In his myths, ,Plato can point towards the greatest mysteries of human life 
by introducing the reader to the mysteries of the ideal, and do so by representing this 
idealistic myth world as a mysterious place. Any mind that is going to have its curiosity 
aroused would be hooked by these wonderful stories about a perfect places, where the 
problems of the human world are not relevant. Such fantastical and addictive paradigms 
of a better world than ours aid philosophy both as an integral part of the overall Adyos 
and as a hook to catch curios~ty and keep it caught. 
However, both the Sophist (218e2) and the Statesman (279a7 -b 1) say that a paradigm 
should be 'aJ.wcpos' (small) because then it is not too big to be manageable. But the 
I 
criticism of the 11vOos in the Statesman, that they were mistaken in looking for a great 
example simply because kingship is great (277b3-4), is only in relation to its narrow role 
51 Janaway, Images ofExcellence, ,Oxford, 1995, pg 160. 
58 Janaway, Images ofExcellence, bxford, 1995, pg 167. 
59 Smith, "Plato's Use of Myth in the Education of Philosophical Man", Phoenix 40, 1986, pg 34. 
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as a paradigm. The excessive embellishments of the puOos have a purpose other than that 
of a simple paradigm of the sort weaving turns to be. Perhaps its fantastical nature proves 
a pleasant distraction from the incessant, bare dialectic, but more importantly its 
mysteries suck both the unsuspecting and the well-prepared into Platonic thought. 
Perhaps on a purely epistemological level "great examples are thus framed as 
inappropriate on methodological grounds"60, but they are a major weapon in Plato's 
methodology of entrapment: how he entices readers into philosophy and then does not let 
them leave. No-one understands everything, everybody wants to. Perhaps in an ideal 
world, there would be no need for puOoz because humans would not have to use 
paradigms as a root to knowledge, but in our world, we do. Since those paradigms are 
necessary, then they can use all the richness of literature. The Statesman's myth got the 
interlocutors back on track and generally livened up the discussion. It struck a balance: 
the mean between what we might now call literature and 'philosophy' (where 
'philosophy' means pure analytical logical philosophy). Relative to dialectic, there may 
be too much 'literature' about it, but it does not really stand on its own as a complete 
story either. However, in saving the discussion, it plays a crucial role. 
Smith61 comments on this enjoyment that seems to flow through the myths: "dialectic, in 
the narrow sense ... can be tedious" but the tone is kept light, even if the subject matter is 
distinctly heavy, because "myth ... is play with a serious purpose." This idea of play is 
emphasised at times by Plato: the myth of the Statesman is achieved by "axs8ov rraz8u1v 
iyK&paaaJl&vovs" ("mixing in an element of play") (268d8). Later we are told how the 
60 Lane, Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman, CUP, 1998, pg 122. 
61 Smith, "Plato's Use ofMyth in the Education of Philosophical Man", Phoenix 40, 1986, pg 25. 
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ideal statesman would look tol find the best combinations of citizens: "nmot{!. npwrov 
f3aaavtsl" ("it will first put them to test in play"). The process of understanding cannot 
I just take place within the confines of a dialogue in a classroom: myth becomes the 
playground ~f education, whJe we learn in a different way about the things discussed in 
class. They attempt to encapsltate, as best as words and language can, the indescribable 
ab~tracts so that we can have l picture of their ideal world. The myths help us approach 
that world from different angll, one which involves imagination and inspires a child-like 
curiosity and should never be laken too seriously, but is also very important in the 
process of understanding. 
The myths are not easily categorised within the framework of modem philosophy. They 
occupy a similar ground to th~ didactic novel: they are, as McCabe62 puts it, neither 
I 
"straightforwardly true" nor "directly false" but "their oddity may help the explanation 
along, rather than getting in itJ way." But this is not at all surprising. The things that the 
dialogues and the myths are aiLed at are definitely, in Plato's world, odd: they are 
invisible, indescribable, perha~s unknowable in a complete sense, but they are the truths 
on which everything in humaj life is based. Just because a myth is not literally or 
·completely true does not meJ that it is therefore a lie. One need look no further than our 
world, as Plato saw it, for thatj what is around us is not absolutely true, it only partakes in 
truth. But it is not a lie either Jecause it is definitely there. It is an approximation of truth; 
it is like truth; it shares truth's characteristics; it is neither truth nor lie. This oddity of 
semi-truth, as McCabe63 points out, is very similar to the veracity present in myth: it does 
62 McCabe "Myth, AJlegory and Argument in Plato", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 1992, pg 47. 
63 McCabe "Myth, AJlegory and Argument in Plato", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 1992, pg 47. 
120 
not claim to be truth, in fact usually there are warnings that it is not, and yet there is an 
inherent claim in it finding its way into the dialogue that it has something to do with 
truth. Its ambiguity, in a way, helps us understand a little better our relationship both to 
the world around us and to the other true world of abstracts. 
The Timaeus helps to identify the place ofmyth64 when Timaeus sets out the different 
kinds ofbeing at 27d6-28a4: "ri ro ov asi, yivsazv OB OVK sxov, Kat ri ro ytyvopsvov 
ov, ro 0' aO Oo/;n Jlcr' aiafJryasws &Adyov Oo/;aarov, ytyvopsvov Kat anOMVJlBVOV, 
ovrws oB ovoinors ov." ("what is that which always is and has no becoming; and what 
is that which is always becoming and never is? That which is apprehended by intelligence 
and reason is always in the same state; but that which is conceived by opinion with the 
help of sensation and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing 
and never really is.") Myth never really is, and yet it is about what always is. Take, for 
example, Adeimantus and the story of the ship in Republic 487b1 ff: such a ship never 
reaJJy was, but it demonstrated perfectly the ideal state. Timaeus 68e6-69a5, itself within 
a kind of myth whose detail is playful but whose principles are true, sets out the two 
guiding forces at work in the universe: "ozo ory JPq ov' airias sL01J owpit;safJaz, ro JlBV 
avayKai'ov, ro OB Osi'ov, Kat ro JlBV Osi'ov iv anaazv s'1rs"iv Krryasws BVBKa 
svoazpovos {3iov, KaO' oaov rypwv ;, ljlvazs ivoixsrat, ro OB avayKai'ov iKsLVWV 
xapzv, AoYlSOJtsvov WS avsv rovrwv ov ovvara aura iKsiva iljl' ots OlZ'OVOat;opsv 
JlOVa Karavos[v ov8 aU Aa.f3srv ov8 UMmS lZ'WS psraaxsiv" ("wherefore we may 
64 Again, following McCabe "Myth, Allegory and Argument in Plato", Apeiron XXV, No 4, December 
1992, pg 62. 
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distinguish two sorts of causes, the one divine and the other necessary, and may seek for 
the divine in all things, as far as our nature admits, with a view to the blessed life; but the 
necessary kind only for the sake of the divine, considering that without them and when 
isolated from them, these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or 
received or in any way shared'by us.") In the world ofmyth, the rules of'necessity' need 
not be involved, the problems of corrupt human nature can be left behind. The reader can 
watch recognisable images from the human world acting out scenes governed by Adyos 
and representing the divine in a world approaching, as close as any human can, the ideal. 
The mental, visionary world of the Republic as a whole is not a system of government to 
be practised by real people: in a perfect world it would work perfectly because it is a 
theoretically rational place. It deliberately ignores the irrationality of humans, that most 
would not see a communal gain as their own gain. In the real world, profit is something 
that can be touched, but in the truly logocentric world of the Republic, all profit stems 
from the enactment of justice. The state created is a model of justice made to aid our 
understanding of justice. That model must use recognisable parts so that we can imagine 
it as a thing, but it is not meant to be taken seriously: the people in that model are 
themselves models and have no human nature. The reality of selfishness destroys the 
image of justice, but one cannot be too literal about the necessarily unjust mortals which 
Plato is forced to use as parts of his model. It is the overall principle which is important; 
it is that which runs through and connects the paradigm and the abstract. The }lvOos 
shows a world where Adyos can reign unchecked by misguided human interference. 
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If one wants to call Plato's myths 'poetry', then this is how they are saved from Plato's 
own famous attack on poetry in Republic X Plato is not reflecting the same thing as 
those he banishes. At Republic 398b 1-2, the poet is allowed who will "imitate the style of 
the virtuous" ("n1v rou imeLICOVS AESlV JllJ.LOtro"); the poets who are banned are 
compared to the painters who only produce "f/JatVOJlEVT"/v" ("an appearance") (596ell) of 
a thing. They do not make poems about the ideal wor1d, the world which we aspire to, but 
the content of their work is a reflection of our physical and imperfect world, which, of 
course, is itself a 'reflection' of the true world of abstracts. Plato's myths are not "of a 
poet or some other life from among those concerned with imitation" ("nOlT"/nxos ij -rwv 
nept J.LiJ.LT"/alV ns a.U..Os apJ.Load') (Ehaedrus 248el-2) but are of"a man who will 
become a lover of wisdom and beauty, or devoted to the Muses or love" ("av8pc)s 
yev71aoJ.Levov f/JzA.oaof/Jov ij f/Jr.AoK&Aov ij JlOVmKov nvos Kat ipwnKov") (Phaedrus 
248d2-4). Both are categorisable as involved in JlOVmKtl, but one loves truth where the 
other expands ignorant conceit about appearances through emotional manipulation. 
Plato's mythologising is to do with a love of good and a spreading ofthat passion. He 
positions himself to occupy the morally worthwhile meaning of J.LovmKl], his divine 
inspiration is truth, and he banishes those who upset a Adyos aimed at happiness through 
an understanding of truth. Plato's myths are accounts of the truth for the sake of pleasure 
through the process of understanding, with the ultimate goal being the ultimate 
understanding. 
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Conclusion 
But even in his myths, Plato is constricted to the realms of our physical and imperfect 
reality. He cannot describe the abstracts in any way other than in language. He must use 
examples of physical things in the ideal situations he tries to create. This can create its 
own interpretative problems when the ideal models are read as potentially physical things 
that can be brought about. But as we have seen, for example in the Statesman, there is a 
large gap between the purity of perfect things and the tainted nature of our physical 
world. 
However we can only approach things that are perfect by using imperfect physical things: 
in order to understand an abstract, we must somehow try to tie it into something that can 
be described. Language cannot describe pure abstracts: the best it can do is use signs that 
stand for those abstracts; it cannot define them because then they would no longer be 
abstract, but would have been made physical in their representation in language. It is part 
of the nature of perfect things that they are indescribable in our far from perfect language. 
We cannot talk or write 'truth', we can only use language to say what it is like. But we 
must not let this fact prevent us from attempting to study truth. If we are to proceed in the 
process of understanding, we must use language; the only study of abstracts available to 
us is to look at 'what they are like', a large part of which is looking at paradigms of 
abstracts. But we cannot reject language, because those paradigms can only be 
constructed in language: these attempts at describing the ideal only exist in words. We 
must be fully aware of the problems of both words by themselves and their combination 
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in language. We must put no faith in words by themselves: they are not a route to truth. 
We must remember that written language is little more than a game: it cannot answer 
back to clarify or defend itself and it is as full of deceitful rhetoric as the spoken kind. 
But no part of human existence is perfect. We must use language as best we can to get 
towards an understanding of the pure and constant things, an understanding which is 
significantly aided by the creation in language of paradigms. The dialogues "lead the 
reader toward the existential ideal of the philosopher: toward life in pure theory."65 
Humans can never achieve life in pure theory because we are tied down by the necessity 
of being in the physical. But we must not let that prevent us from aiming at the pure; we 
must work within that physical framework to create, as best we can, an attempt at the 
ideal. This can only be done in language, when we use it to show what the ideal might be 
like. 
65 Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics; Phenomenological Interpretation Relating to the Philebus, trans. M. 
Wallace, Yale, 1991, pg 2. 
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